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Domestic Partnership: Recognition and 
Responsibility 
RAYMOND C. O'BRIEN* 
A domestic partnership is a business or political recognition of 
two adults seeking to share benefits normally conferred upon 
married couples. To date, partnerships have conferred benefits 
only; the most logical progression is for partnerships to include 
responsibilities of support, commitment and obligation within the 
economic partnership construct of emerging family law. When this 
occurs, heterosexual couples may lack incentive, but homosexual 
couples will achieve surer due process recognition regardless of 
same-sex marriage litigation. 
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I. AN INTRODUCTION TO THE ISSUES 
First and foremost, domestic partnership is an index of belonging. It 
is a response to what Erich Fromm identifies as the deepest human need, 
"the need to overcome ... separateness, to leave the prison 
of ... aloneness."1 Examined within this context, isolated from the 
hyperbole of family values, morality, and economic costs, domestic 
partnership is little more than a modicum of public recognition given to 
a private contract between two consenting adults.2 It is a civil partner-
ship supported by private or public policy, or both. 
Yet, standing at that index of belonging, domestic partnership ripples 
through "[s]hared beliefs, social and cultural metanarratives shaped in 
accordance with dominant ideology."3 It is because of what it conjures, 
not because of what it does, that feverish opposition is raised: "The 
perceived increase in nontraditional intimate entities has generated both 
celebration and concern." 4 But this concern is not without benefit to all 
sides affected by domestic partnerships. Those parties who sense in 
domestic partnership an attack upon traditional notions of family, 
1. ERICH FROMM, THE ART OF LOVING 9 (1956). 
2. See, e.g., Jonathan P. Hicks, A Legal Threshold is Crossed by Gay Couples in 
New York, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 1993, at Al. 
Id. 
Some came as if headed to a formal event, dressed in tuxedos or party dresses. 
Many had to go to work and wore business suits or casual slacks. All of 
them-the first 109 couples to register as "domestic partners" in the City of 
New York-left with something long withheld, an official acknowledgement 
of their untraditional lives. 
3. Martha A. Fineman, Our Sacred Institution: The Ideal of the Family in 
American Law and Society, 1993 UTAH L. REV. 387, 337-38 (footnote omitted). 
4. Id. at 393; see also Craig A. Bowman & Blake M. Comish, Note, A More 
Perfect Union: A Legal and Social Analysis of Domestic Partnership Ordinances, 92 
COLUM. L. REV. 1164, 1186 (1992); Rebecca L. Melton, Note, Legal Rights of 
Unmarried Heterosexual and Homosexual Couples and Evolving Definitions of 
"Family", 29 J. FAM. L. 497 (1991); Adrienne K. Wilson, Note, Same-Sex Marriage: 
A Review, 17 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 539 (1991). 
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religion, and community values5 should recognize an opportunity for 
strengthening through dialogue over the core notion of family. Those 
who celebrate the availability of domestic partnership should recognize, 
in the struggle for acceptance, the core values which contribute to the 
functioning, belonging intimate entity. It is the premise of this Article 
that the advent of domestic partnership is not a win/lose situation for 
either side of the debate, but rather a win/win situation in which both 
sides benefits through dialogue.6 
A. Defining Domestic Partnership 
What then is domestic partnership? In its simplicity, domestic 
partnership is one step more than cohabitation, but one step less than 
marriage. Its essential ingredient is a business or government recogni-
tion of benefits conferred on a non-marital adult couple of the same or 
opposite sex because of conformity with a procedure established by the 
business or govemment.7 Increasingly, both businesses and govern-
5. See, e.g., MARY ANN GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN FAMILY 
LAW (1989); MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW (1987); 
Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 115 
(1992); Michael W. McConnell, Neutrality Under the Religion Clauses, 81 Nw. U. L. 
REv. 146 (1986); John T. Noonan, Jr., The Constitution's Protection of Individual 
Rights: The Real Role of the Religion Clauses, 49 U. PITT. L. REV. 717 (1988); John 
T. Noonan, Jr., Principled or Pragmatic Foundations for the Freedom of Conscience?, 
5 J.L. & RELIGION 203 (1987); Bruce C. Hafen, Individualism and Autonomy in Family 
Law: The Waning of Belonging, 1991 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1; Bruce C. Hafen, The Family 
as an Entity, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 865 (1989); Bruce C. Hafen, The Constitutional 
Status of Marriage, Kinship, and Sexual Privacy-Balancing the Individual and Social 
Interests, 81 MICH. L. REV. 463 (1983). 
6. Professor Carl Schneider writes that law has become a means by which people 
avoid moral discourse; this does not contribute to the common good. Instead, he 
advocates moral discourse as a necessary and effective means to address waning 
religiosity. See Carl E. Schneider, Moral Discourse and the Transformation of American 
Family Law, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1803 (1985); see also Elizabeth S. Scott, Rational 
Decisionmaldng About Marriage and Divorce, 76 VA. L. REV. 9 (1990). 
7. The judiciary could interpret a state statute so as to confer benefits upon a non-
marital couple as well. See, e.g., Braschi v. Stahl Assocs. Co., 543 N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. Ct. 
App. 1989) (interpreting New York City Rent and Eviction Regulations to allow for the 
survivor of two men who had shared an apartment for more than 10 years, to benefit 
from rent control as the surviving member of a "family"). For a recent extension of this 
familial development, see Dunphy v. Gregory, 642 A.2d 372 (N.J. 1994), which held that 
unmarried cohabitants who exhibit intimate familial relationship that is stable, enduring, 
substantial, and mutually supportive, and who witness wrongful death or serious physical 
injury to the other cohabitant, may recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress. 
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ments have provided the mechanism through which, by contract, a 
period of time together, or registration, specified benefits may be 
conferred upon a partner even though sexual contact is an ele-
ment----although not a material one - of the arrangement. 8 At present, 
benefits could include health care, hospital visitation, housing, or other 
specific benefits able to be conferred by the business or government.9 
These newly established domestic partnerships are, particularly for the 
homosexual couple, a means by which one partner may be able to 
remain at home and still receive benefits because of the employment of 
the other partner. They have become a means by which equality of 
benefits extends to couples regardless of sexual orientation.10 An 
examination of the definition and scope of domestic partnership will be 
the focus of Part II of this Article. 
Because domestic partnerships involve persons living together in 
relationships that most often involve sexual activity, they should be 
examined within the context of judicial, legal, and public acceptance of 
arrangements involving sexual activity. Contrary to public opinion, the 
seminal privacy decision of Griswold v. Connecticut11 in 1965 did not 
eliminate the judicial restriction upon what was then called meretricious 
relationships. The right to privacy in Griswold was confined to married 
cohabitants and thus only persons of the opposite sex acting as a unit 
were sanctioned by the state. By 1972 however, "Griswold's right of 
8. For a recent survey of business and government requirements to establish a 
domestic partnership, see M.V. Lee Badgett, Equal Pay for Equal Families, ACADEME, 
May-June 1994, at 26, 29. They include: (1) minimum time requirements either before 
a partner is eligible or before a partnership is dissolved; (2) evidence of financial 
interdependence; (3) sharing a joint residence; (4) boundaries for the relationship, 
including exclusivity, no close blood relationship, and no current legal partner; (5) 
naming the partner as a beneficiary of life insurance or pension plan. Id. 
9. See, e.g., Not Enough for Domestic Partners, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 1993, at 
A20 ( editorial). Former New York City Mayor David Dinkins' executive order providing 
for domestic partnership in New York City allowed for homosexual and heterosexual 
adults to register as partners and qualify for city apartments in the same manner as 
married couples, have the same visiting rights at city jails and hospitals, and those who 
work for the city may take unpaid leave to care for newborn children. 
10. A staff oncologist at Montefiore Medical Center sued the hospital because she 
was receiving only half of the benefits of her heterosexual peer. That is, because the 
heterosexual employee was married, her or his spouse would be entitled to benefits from 
his or her employer. Nonetheless, because the homosexual employee was unable to 
marry because of laws prohibiting him or her, the same benefits were unavailable to his 
or her partner even though both heterosexual and homosexual persons worked the same 
number of hours. See James Barron, Bronx Hospital Gives Gay Couples Spouse 
Benefits, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 1991, at Al; see also Badgett, supra note 8, at 26. 
11. 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that the state may not interfere in the marital 
privacy enjoyed by two adults). For an analysis as to how this privacy right should 
apply to unmarried homosexual persons, see Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 
HARV. L. REV. 737 (1989). But see Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
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privacy, ostensibly based upon the nobility of marriage as a social 
institution, was converted by Eisenstadt v. Baird12 into the right of the 
individual, married or unmarried, to be free of unwarranted governmental 
intrusion into his [or her] sexual conduct."13 This privacy right of the 
adult individual to be free from governmental regulation in sexual 
matters shortly resulted in the California case of Marvin v. Marvin. 14 
When the woman plaintiff in Marvin brought suit against her 
cohabitant, she alleged that she had given up her career as an entertainer 
to devote full time to being a "companion, homemaker, housekeeper and 
cook" for the defendant, and for this he promised to provide her with 
support for the remainder of her life.15 There was no written record of 
the contract, and the male defendant denied all the material elements and 
alleged that any such arrangement was contrary to public policy since 
sexual activity was implied in the arrangement. His argument being that 
the state should not enforce a contract when immoral----and perhaps 
illegal - sexual activity was a part of the arrangement. 16 
The California Supreme Court recognized that many more persons 
were living together in non-marital cohabitation and thus any claim 
based upon such an arrangement should not be barred by public policy 
as long as the contract did not explicitly provide for sexual services.17 
It is significant that the California court took notice of the changing 
definition of relationships in its jurisdiction to arrive at its decision. 18 
Thus, after Marvin, non-married persons were able to contract between 
12. 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
13. HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED 
STATES § 2.1, at 27 (2d ed. 1988). For a discussion of the impact of Griswold and 
Eisenstadt, see Janet L. Dolgin, The Family in Transition: From Griswold to Eisenstadt 
and Beyond, 82 GEO. L.J. 1519 (1994). 
14. 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976). The plaintiff 
eventually lost her appeal, but not without establishing the rights of non-marital parties 
to contract together even though sexual relations were a part of the bargain. See Marvin 
v. Marvin, 122 Cal. App. 3d 871, 176 Cal. Rptr. 555 (1981). 
15. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d at 666, 557 P.2d at 110, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 819. 
16. Id. at 668; 557 P.2d at 112, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 821. 
17. Id. at 665,557 P.2d at 110, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 819. 
18. In 1993, the Supreme Court of Hawaii allowed an equal protection challenge 
to its opposite sex requirement for statutory marriage, in part, because of its recognition 
that conditions had changed in society. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 48 (Haw. 1993) 
(explaining that "customs change with an evolving social order''). But see Herbert W. 
Titus, Defining Marriage and the Family, 3 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 327 (1994) 
(arguing that the focus should not be on social change, but upon a moral order imposed 
by God or nature). 
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themselves in a like manner to antenuptial agreements between married 
persons, even though these non-marital contracts did not have to be in 
writing, 19 and they were effective immediately, not upon marriage. The 
contractual element in the Marvin situations, and antenuptial agreements 
for prospectively married persons, is important because it signals a shift 
in focus from the status of the arrangement to the partnership of the 
parties.20 
Because of Griswold, Eisenstadt, and Marvin, the next stage was 
possible: domestic partnerships.21 Domestic partnerships provided 
benefits that previously had been reserved to marriage. 22 The partner-
ship was expanded beyond consideration of what the parties could do 
for each other, to what the business or state would do for each of the 
parties expressly because of the partnership. Furthermore, it allowed for 
these marriage-like benefits to be conferred on opposite-sex partners, as 
well as same-sex partners; this ratified the private nature of the 
partnership and the choice of the participants. This uniquely private 
element would not be permitted within marriage, a status arrangement 
where the state is the historical third-party participant. This is a 
significant development and must be viewed within the progression 
through Griswold, Eisenstadt, and Marvin; it affirms the expanding 
nature of partnership in relationships. 
19. The Uniform Premarital Agreement Act is law in several states and provides 
that all premarital agreements must be in writing. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE§ 1611 
(West 1994). 
20. It is important to note that neither legislators nor courts initiated the changes 
that brought the focus from status to partnership. The following assessment is 
illustrative: "Law cannot lead where other constitutive discourses and philosophies will 
not follow. Other disciplines such as economics, psychology, sociology, public policy, 
anthropology, biology, and history, all have their own narratives about the family with 
certain values and assumptions embedded in them." Fineman, supra note 3, at 398. Or 
to put it more simply: "Since the courts read the newspapers and have always been 
sensitive· to political movements, their decisions reflect the same conflicts and 
ambivalence concerning marriage which are prevalent in our society. This is particularly 
true of the United States Supreme Court." CLARK, JR., supra note 13, § 2.1, at 27. 
21. Some would argue that because of these cases and others, the courts allowed 
for the deterioration of marriage. See, e.g., Mary Ann Glendon, Marriage and the State: 
The Withering Away of Marriage, 62 VA. L. REV. 663 (1976); John T. Noonan, Jr., The 
Family and The Supreme Court, 23 CATH. U. L. REV. 255 (1973). 
22. See, e.g., Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993). The Hawaii Supreme 
Court remanded the case to determine state's prohibition of same-sex marriage. The 
court stated: "Marriage is a state-conferred legal partnership status, the existence of 
which gives rise to a multiplicity of rights and benefits reserved exclusively to that 
particular relation." Id. at 58. For a recitation of those benefits, see id. at 59. 
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B. Marriage and Domestic Partnership 
The true significance of domestic partnership lies in its similarity to 
marriage. Because it is similar, it offers an alternative. What would 
occur if adults in the United States decided to abandon the state-involved 
status of marriage for a partnership containing all of the ingredients of 
marriage, including obligations, benefits, and termination?23 
To answer, it is necessary to examine the status concept of marriage 
in its historical sense. Based on the acknowledged expertise of Professor 
Homer H. Clark, Jr., the essential ingredients of marriage are: 
(1) A ceremony, with a 
(2) minister or delegate of the state, 
(3) consummation by the parties who are 
(4) capable of consenting without fraud or duress, 
( 5) to a permanent, monogamous relationship between a 
(6) man and a woman who inhabit a joint domicile, and the 
(7) incidents of the relationship are the province of the law and not 
within the control of the parties.24 
While informal marriage, common law unions, are still allowed, the 
method by which the status of marriage has been conferred has remained 
similar in the Western world for hundreds of years. The purpose of the 
method was to ensure an economic producing unit of society with 
responsibilities for child rearing; today that purpose includes opportuni-
ties for mutual affection, companionship, and sexual satisfaction.25 
Even though domestic partnership and other alternatives to traditional 
marriage have gained attention and have flourished,26 all alternatives 
23. Inequality between contracting parties would both jeopardize the partnership 
and invite state participation in a renewed status arrangement. Throughout the Middle 
Ages, the emerging Christian Church regularized marriage into the status arrangement 
that exists today in an attempt to protect a party to the marriage, spouse or child, who 
was unable to participate equally in the partnership. See generally DAVID HERLIHY, 
MEDIEVAL HOUSEHOLDS (1985). 
24. See CLARK, JR., supra note 13, § 2.1, at 21-25. 
25. Id. at 25. For a discussion of the initial changes and challenges to the 
definition of marriage, see Lenore J. Weitzman,Lega/ Regulation of Marriage: Tradition 
and Change, 62 CAL. L. REV. 1169 (1974); Mary Ann Glendon, Power and Authority 
in the Family: New Legal Patterns as Reflections of Changing Ideologies, 23 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 1 (1975). 
26. A number of other case developments "may be regarded as diminishing the 
significance of marriage as a social institution." CLARK, JR., supra note 13, § 2.1, at 29. 
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acknowledge marriage as the "core affiliation."27 "Legal recognition 
of these alternatives is justified by reference to their similarity to 
heterosexual marriage in regard to the emotional and economic functions 
assumed in the creation of a sexual tie. "28 Thus, marriage as a status 
has not been rejected, nor is it in danger of being abolished, but in that 
it is challenged by an alternative, its authority as well as its centrality is 
being debated. This debate is good. 
For some adults, however, the marriage status cannot be abandoned 
because it was never an option. Thus, persons related by consanguinity 
or affinity would be prohibited from marriage because of prohibitions 
against incest. Gay and lesbian persons would not find marriage an 
available option because the status of marriage does not presently 
provide for their sexual orientation.29 Perhaps because of the efforts of 
this latter group---homosexuals--the alternative to marriage as found in 
domestic partnership has developed more rapidly than expected. But 
even if this is true, some gay and lesbian persons would even reject the 
status of marriage as "an inherently problematic institution that betrays 
the promise of both lesbian and gay liberation and radical feminism. "30 
See, e.g., United States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973); New Jersey 
Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619 (1973) (both cases holding that marriage 
has no effect on entitlement to state benefits). 
27. Fineman, supra note 3, at 394; see also David K. Flaks, Gay and Lesbian 
Families: Judicial Assumptions, Scientific Realities, 3 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 345 
(1994). 
28. Fineman, supra note 3, at 394. For recent examples of this use of analogy, see 
William M. Hohengarten, Note, Same-Sex Marriage and the Right of Privacy, 103 YALE 
L.J. 1495 (1994); David P. Russman, Note, Alternative Families: In Whose Best 
Interests?, 27 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 31 (1993); James Trosino, American Wedding: 
Same-Sex Marriage and the Miscegenation Analogy, 73 B.U. L. REV. 93 (1993); William 
N. Eskridge, Jr., A History of Same-Sex Marriage, 79 VA. L. REV. 1419 (1993). 
29. The use of the word orientation is deliberate; it represents a conclusion that 
homosexuality is not a choice, but rather an orientation brought about through genetics 
or hormones. See Daniel R. Ortiz, Creating Controversy: Essentialism and 
Constructivism and the Politics of Gay Identity, 79 VA. L. REV. 1833, 1836-43 (1993); 
Dean H. Hamer et al., A Linkage Between DNA Markers on the X Chromosome and 
Male Sexual Orientation, 261 SCIENCE 321 (1993); Simon LeVay, A Difference in 
Hypothalamic Structure Between Heterosexual and Homosexual Men, 253 SCIENCE 
1034 (1991); RICHARD C. FRIEDMAN, MALE HOMOSEXUALITY: A CONTEMPORARY 
PSYCHOANALYTIC PERSPECTIVE (1988); Richard Green, The Immutability of (Ho-
mo)sexual Orientation: Behavioral Science Implications for a Constitutional (Legal) 
Analysis, 16 J. PSYCHlATRY & L. 537 (1988); SIGMUND FREUD, THREE ESSAYS ON THE 
THEORY OF SEXUALITY (James Strachey trans., 1962) (1905); C.W. Socarides, A 
Provisional Theory of Male Homosexuality, 49 INT'L J. PSYCHlATRY 27 (1968). Sexual 
orientation immutability was an issue in the recent same-sex Hawaiian decision. See 
Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 53 (Haw. 1993). 
30. Nancy D. Polikoff, We Will Get What We Ask For: Why Legalizing Gay and 
Lesbian Marriage Will Not "Dismantle the Legal Structure of Gender in Every 
Marriage", 79 VA. L. REV. 1535, 1536 (1993). For analysis of the opinion that same-
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But obtaining the right to marry can be viewed as a liberating victory. 
Gay and lesbian organizations such as Lambda Legal Defense and 
Education Fund advocate and support test case litigation and education 
about "virtually every area of concern to lesbians and gay men, 
including discrimination in employment, housing, and the military; 
AIDS and HIV-related policy and healthcare; parenting and relationship 
issues; domestic partner benefits; immigration; and constitutional 
rights."31 Denied the option of marriage, the homosexual community 
has made domestic partnership a civil rights issue, accelerating its 
adoption by both business and government entities. Indeed, if responsi-
bility, in addition to the current benefits, becomes an ingredient of 
domestic partnership, the due process recognition of gay and lesbian 
relationships will be significantly advanced. This Article will explore 
the due process and equal protection impacts domestic partnership will 
have upon the gay and lesbian community, homosexual marriage, and 
the future development of domestic partnerships. 
C. Morality, Religion, and Domestic Partnership 
At a minimum, domestic partnership has brought attention to the 
changes in family law. "Family law has moved from a patriarchal 
structure to a model of formal gender equality with an emphasis on 
rights of individuals within the family."32 This new definition differs 
in significant degree from the constitutional decisions affecting equality, 
privacy, and the nature of individual rights. Objections to this definition 
assert that it represents nothing more than "a celebration of 'self' as the 
sex marriage is harmful to the gay and lesbian community, see Eskridge, Jr., supra note 
28, at 1486-93. 
31. Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund Statement of Purpose, 10 LAMBDA 
UPDATE 1, 2 (1993). 
32. Linda J. Lacey, Mimicking the Words, But Missing the Message: The Misuse 
of Cultural Feminist Themes in Religion and Family Law Jurisprudence, 35 B.C. L. 
REV. 1, 2 (1993). Such an idea is not without its critics. Id. at 23-25. But it would be 
difficult to deny, at least from an examination of the current jurisprudence, that the 
definition is correct. See also Lucinda M. Finley, Breaking Women's Silence in Law: 
The Dilemma of the Gendered Nature of Legal Reasoning, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 886 
(1989); Frances Olsen, From False Paternalism to False Equality: Judicial Assaults on 
Feminist Community, Illinois, 1869-1895, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1518 (1986); MARY ANN 
GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW (1987); Martha Minow, 
Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REV. 10 (1987). 
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ultimate concern, the final arbiter, the trump to all moral claim."33 
Pointing to such studies as Beyond Rhetoric,34 a detailed study of the 
plight of children in America who have been abused, neglected, and 
abandoned by parents, critics of the new definition of family place the 
blame upon parents' celebration of self. 
Another criticism of the new definition of family is that there is an 
absence of moral discourse.35 What is missing in the new definition of 
family is a moral discourse about such issues as non-marital cohabita-
tion, adultery, homosexuality, sexual relations, and reproduction.36 
Instead, the law has provided for a "psychologic man"37 whose search 
for self-fulfillment comes before everything else, and who instead of 
seeking what is good, seeks only what works.38 
It is difficult to accurately identify what is moral; the task is easier if 
there is an explicit reference to an objective religion. Of course another 
criticism of the new family is that it does not accommodate religious 
values. 39 Perhaps the most famous exponent of the view that religion 
in America should be taken more seriously is Stephen L. Carter. He 
writes in The Culture of Disbelief that: "The legal culture that guards the 
public square still seems most comfortable thinking of religion as a 
hobby, something done in privacy, something that mature, public-spirited 
33. Elizabeth Mensch & Alan Freeman, The Politics of Virtue: Animals, Theology 
and Abortion, 25 GA. L. REV. 923, 1121 (1991). 
34. NATIONAL COMM'N ON CHILDREN, BEYOND RHETORIC: A NEW AMERICAN 
AGENDA FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES (1991). 
35. See, e.g., Schneider, supra note 6. Professor Schneider has been characterized 
by one author as "defender of the [o]rder." Lacey, supra note 32, at 29. "Schneider's 
overall theme that moral dialogue has disappeared from family law implicitly suggests 
that those who advocate changes in the area are immoral or at best amoral." Id. 
36. See generally Carl E. Schneider, State-Interest Analysis and the Channelling 
Function in Family Law, 55 ALB. L. REV. 669 (1992). 
37. Schneider, supra note 6, at 1845. 
38. Id. at 1848. For a critique of Professor Schneider's argument, see Steve 
Susoeff, Comment, Assessing Children's Best Interests When a Parent is Gay or 
Lesbian: Toward a Rational Custody Standard, 32 UCLA L. REV. 852 (1985). Susoeff 
argues that judges do take what is defined as immoral behavior into consideration when 
making custody determinations. See also Paul Finkehnan, Family, Crime, and Govern-
ment Interests: Commentary on Schneider and Stith, 55 ALB. L. REV. 689 (1992); 
Carrie G. Costello, Legitimate Bonds and Unnatural Unions: Race, Sexual Orientation, 
and Control of the American Family, 15 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 79 (1992); Martha 
Minow, The Free Exercise of Families, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 925. 
39. On the occasion of the United Nations 1994 International Year of the Family, 
the National Conference of Catholic Bishops published a pastoral message from the 
United States Catholic Bishops to families. See FOLLOWING THEW AY OF LOVE (1993); 
see also U.S. CATHOLIC CONFERENCE, PUTIING CHILDREN AND FAMILIES FIRST (1992); 
POPE JOHN PAUL II, LETTER TO FAMILIES FOR THE INTERNATIONAL YEAR OF THE 
FAMILY (1994). 
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adults do not use as the basis for politics."40 In his call for religious 
respect, he implies religious accommodation and gives as successful 
examples of accommodation the civil rights struggle,41 capital punish-
ment,42 abortion and euthanasia,43 and teaching values.44 Note that 
he is not advocating an end to discourse, nor to any more certitude than 
those advocating elimination of religious considerations. Yet what he 
does advocate is that: 
[R]eligions, for all their arrogance and sinfulness, can often provide approaches 
to the consideration of ultimate questions that a world yet steeped in materialis-
tic ideologies desperately requires .... [I]t is vital that the religions struggle to 
maintain the tension between the meanings and understanding propounded by 
the state and the very different set of meanings and understandings that the 
contemplation of the ultimate frequently suggests.45 
There is a tension between morality and religion versus domestic 
partnership. This tension is due in part to the belief on both sides that 
domestic partnership is an element that will tip the balance of power 
from one side to the other. One side views it as at least the secular 
sanctification of meretricious sexual activity and, at most, surely the next 
step before the legalization of homosexual marriages. The other side 
views it as economic and political recognition of either choice, or the 
due process recognition of sexual orientation that will precipitate 
additional gains in individual liberty. Again, it is the premise of this 
Article that domestic partnership is, most simply, an issue about 
belonging; it is not a win/lose battle. Rather, through dialogue, it is a 
win/win issue.46 Advocates of natural law or religious conviction have 
something to contribute; advocates of change have the same. 
Professor Carter, in his argument for accommodating religion, provides 
a helpful comment to those advocating moral and religious positions. 
He writes: 
40. STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF 54 (1993). 
41. Id. at 227-29. 
42. Id. at 258-62. 
43. Id. at 232-58. 
44. Id. at 200-06. 
45. Id. at 273. 
46. See generally Michael W. McConnell, The Role of Democratic Politics In 
Transforming Moral Convictions Into Law, 98 YALE L.J. 1501 (1989) (reviewing 
MICHAEL J. PERRY, MORALITY, POLITICS, AND LAW (1988)); Noonan, Jr., supra note 5; 
McConnell, supra note 5. 
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If, as most Americans believe, there is a God external to the human mind, and 
if that God has tried to communicate with us, whether through revelation or 
some other path, then the human task is surely to discover the contents of that 
communication, not to surrender that possibility in return for the freedom to call 
one's own politics God's will.47 . 
Even if some believe that God's will is quite clear on any point,48 
surely the value of revelation from God's will could benefit from 
explanation and dialogue. We can all take solace in the acknowledge-
ment by the Supreme Court of Hawaii that: "[W]e do not believe that 
trial judges are the ultimate authorities on the subject of Divine Will."49 
For those that advocate that there are many forms of morality that do 
not derive from religion,50 dialogue provides ascertainment of those 
many forms. Surely, among those many forms of morality must be a 
sensitivity for those persons and institutions still unable to comprehend 
the "major changes in family law, and law and religion, brought about 
by the. dominance of liberal thought."51 This sensitivity is of even 
greater value if it can be extended to those who never extended it 
before.52 If the persistent objection of those seeking the freedom to 
explore alternatives not encompassed within a traditional Judea-Christian 
model is the fundamental right to choose, then this right to choose 
should extend to those maintaining religious values as well. Both sides 
must concentrate on a win/win milieu. 
47. CARTER, supra note 40, at 73.-
48. See generally Titus, supra note 18; Daniel 0. Conkle, Religious Purpose, 
Inerrancy, and the Establishment Clause, 67 IND. L.J. 1 (1991); David M. Smolin, 
Regulating Religious and Cultural Conflict in Postmodern America: A Response to 
Professor Perry, 76 IOWA L. REV. 1067 (1991) (reviewing MICHAEL J. PERRY, LOVE 
AND POWER: THE ROLE OF RELIGION AND MORALITY IN AMERICAN POLITICS (1991)); 
David M. Smolin, The Judeo-Christian Tradition and Self-Censorship in Legal 
Discourse, 13 U. DAYTON L. REV. 345 (1988). 
49. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 63 (Haw. 1993). 
50. See generally Lacey, supra note 32, at 29 ( describing the many perspectives 
within family law jurisprudence, those derived from religion and those derived from 
secularity). 
51. Id. at 2. 
52. For examples of authors expressing the need for dialogue and sensitivity, see 
RUTH COLKER, ABORTION & DIALOGUE: PRO-CHOICE, PRO-LIFE, AND AMERICAN LAW 
(1992); Ruth Colker, Feminism, Theology, and Abortion: Toward Love, Compassion, 
and Wisdom, 77 CAL. L.REv. 1011 (1989); Judith Areen, A Need For Caring, 86 MICH. 
L. REV. 1067 (1988); Lynne N. Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REV. 
1574 (1987); Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional 
Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REV. 543 (1986). 
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D. Where Lies The Future? 
The future of domestic partnerships is expansive. In both business and 
political enterprises, partnership is nurtured by the ideology of individual 
freedom, sustained by the economic necessity of recruiting and retaining 
good employees and citizens, and warranted by legal doctrines of equal 
protection,53 privacy,54 due process,55 freedom of speech,56 and free-
dom from discrimination based on sexual orientation. 57 In addition, the 
partnership initiatives are sparked by local initiatives, something the 
current federal judiciary favors over judicial activism.58 They are 
53. See, e.g., Stephen Zamansky, Note, Colorado's Amendment 2 and 
Homosexuals' Right to Equal Protection of the Law, 35 B.C. L. REV. 221 (1993) 
(arguing for equal protection of the law for homosexuals). 
54. See generally Hohengarten, supra note 28 (arguing for a holistic approach to 
the law governing marriage, thereby imposing a duty on the state to justify its exclusion 
of gay and lesbian persons from a specific relationship); Marc A. Fajer, Can Two Real 
Men Eat Quiche Together? Storytelling, Gender-Role Stereotypes, and Legal Protection 
for Lesbians and Gay Men, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 511 (1992) (arguing that same-sex 
couples will never achieve true equality until they are free to discuss their private 
relationships in the same manner as heterosexual couples); David Link, Comment, The
Tie That Binds: Recognizing Privacy and the Family Commitments of Same-Sex 
Couples, 23 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1055 (1990), 
55. Generally, due process constitutional claims are best utilized by majority 
populations and practices, and equal protection by minorities. Nonetheless, at least one 
author advocates that litigation involving homosexuals should "combine substantive due 
process claims that focus on conduct with equal protection claims that focus on status." 
Patricia A. Cain, Litigating for Lesbian and Gay Rights: A Legal History, 79 VA. L. 
REV. 1551, 1619 (1993) (due process would emphasize the right to engage in loving 
conduct, including sexual conduct); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Sexual Orientation and 
the Constitution: A Note on the Relationship Between Due Process and Equal 
Protection, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1161 (1988). 
56. At least three cases involving the military and discharge of homosexuals 
resulted from speech, that is, acknowledgement that the military person was homosexual. 
See Meinhold v. United States Dep't of Defense, 808 F. Supp. 1455 (C.D. Cal. 1993); 
Steffan v. Cheney, 920 F.2d 74 (D.C. Cir. 1990); BenShalom v. Marsh, 703 F. Supp. 
1372 (E.D. Wis.) (1989), rev'd, 881 F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 
1004 (1990). See generally Nan D. Hunter, Identity, Speech, and Equality, 79 VA. L. 
REV. 1695 (1993) (arguing that the First Amendment provides the most reliable path to 
success of any of the doctrinal claims made by lesbian and gay rights lawyers). 
57. See, e.g., Mary A. Case, Couples and Coupling in the Public Sphere: A 
Comment on the Legal History of Litigating for Lesbian and Gay Rights, 79 VA. L. REV. 
1643 (1993); Tracey Rich, Note, Sexual Orientation Discrimination in the. Wake of 
Bowers v. Hardwick, 22 GA. L. REV. 773 (1988). 
58. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992) (state has the 
ability to enact regulations to protect its citizens); Webster v. Reproductive Health Serv., 
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domestic matters, traditionally an area from which the federal judiciary 
will abstain from exercising jurisdiction unless confronted with egregious 
harm. 59 It is safe to assume that domestic partnership will continue to 
expand. 
This Article shall examine three possibilities for expansion in domestic 
partnerships: First, because it offers a sense of public belonging to the 
lesbian and gay community, the unique opportunity of partnership shall 
be examined. In particular, to this point, the partnership arrangement 
has centered on benefits----health, visitation, and real estate. But what of 
responsibilities? For a partnership to offer a viable sense of family, it 
will need to expand to either a statutory or an implied theory of 
responsibility, and thus it will envision support obligations as well. 
Second, once obligations become involved, domestic partnership 
becomes even more similar to marriage. Will the ability to marry 
follow? This issue has particular consequences for the lesbian and gay 
community, especially in light of the precarious legal future of marriage 
litigation. 60 Finally, even without the possibility of marriage, what are 
the likely areas into which domestic partnership may expand benefits? 
One is testamentary transfer, especially since the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Law revised the Uniform Probate Code 
in 1990 to include multiple references to the changing American 
family.61 The ability of a domestic partner to inherit from. an intestate 
partner, elect against a partner's last will and testament, and benefit from 
exempt property and allowances, may be statutory changes of the future. 
This Article shall discuss the various issues, indentified in Part I, that 
surround the domestic partnership device. Part II shall define the current 
structure of domestic partnership benefits, including both business and 
government models. Part III shall examine current cases affecting the 
492 U.S. 490, 521 (1989) ("But the goal of constitutional adjudication is surely not to 
remove inexorably 'politically divisive' issues from the ambit of the legislative process, 
whereby the people through their elected representatives deal with matters of concern 
to them."). 
59. See Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 112 S. Ct. 2206 (1992) (federal courts continue 
to abstain from interference in state domestic relations matters). 
60. See generally Trosino, supra note 28; Jennifer L. Reeb, Comment, 
Homosexual Marriage, the Changing American Family, and the Heterosexual Right to 
Privacy, 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 347 (1993); Otis R. Damslet, Note, Same-Sex 
Marriage, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 555 (1993); Edward J. Juel, Note, Non-
traditional Family Values: Providing Quasi-marital Rights to Same-Sex Couples, 13 
B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 317 (1993). Much of the doubts center on the judicial action 
surrounding Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993) (holding that the state's 
prohibition of same-sex marriage is subject to strict scrutiny under the Hawaii 
Constitution and remanding for consideration of any compelling state interest that might 
justify classification). 
61. See infra notes 273-87 and accompanying text. 
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establishment of domestic partnerships, as well as the public policy 
arguments used against them. Part IV shall discuss the specific role that 
domestic partnerships have had in the gay and lesbian community. Part 
V discusses the next stage beyond benefits: responsibilities, and gives 
specific examples of how domestic partners could acquire benefits and 
responsibilities through expansion of contractual and statutory elements. 
II. DEFINING DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIPS 
A. The Business Community 
Business was first. In the introduction to his book, The 100 Best 
Companies for Gay Men and Lesbians, Ed Mickens writes that: 
"Employers who do well addressing gay and lesbian issues are the 
organizations that will excel in the years to come."62 The assessment 
is based on economics. This is not just because of the economic power 
of the homosexual community or the ability of organizations to attract 
and retain employees, but because "organizations that address gay and 
lesbian issues demonstrate a willingness to listen and respond to the 
concerns of all their employees."63 The economics of domestic 
partnership is crucial, be the employees heterosexual or homosexual, and 
the simplicity of that approach tempts the observer to corivert to the 
legal world of law and economics. 64 Thus, despite the concerns of 
morality, discrimination, similarity to marriage, and imprecision of 
62. ED MICKENS, THE 100 BEST COMPANIES FOR GAY MEN AND LESBIANS 1 
(1994). Other helpful publications are: DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIP ORGANIZING MANUAL 
($10.00), available from the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force Publications Dept., 
173414th Street, NW, Washington D.C. 20009-4309; RECOGNIZING LESBIAN AND GAY 
FAMILIES: STRATEGIES FOR OBTAINING DOMESTIC PARTNERS BENEFITS (1992) ($15.00), 
available from National Center for Lesbian Rights, 1663 Mission Street, 5th Floor, San 
Francisco, Ca. 94103; NEGOTIATING FOR EQUAL BENEFITS ($15.00), available from the 
Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc. at 666 Broadway, New York, New 
York 10012-9849. 
63. MICKENS, supra note 62, at 2. But see Barbara P. Noble, Attitudes Clash on 
Jobs and AIDS, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 1993, § 3, at 25. (Reporting that the National Gay 
and Lesbian Task Force Policy Institute got only 98 completed surveys from the Fortune 
1,000 companies including a study; there were 145 outright refusals, and of the 
companies responding, only five offered domestic partnership benefits.) 
64. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell & Richard A. Posner, An Economic 
Approach to Issues of Religious Freedom, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1989) (advocating that 
difficult issues can be resolved if simply reduced to economic considerations). 
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definition, business "just went and did it" because employees convinced 
themselves, their peers, and management that it was good for busi-
ness.65 
Initially, it is important to note that when providing domestic 
partnership benefits, some businesses and localities do not provide them 
for both heterosexual and homosexual partners; some exclude heterosex-
ual partners. The rationale for exclusion of heterosexuals being that they 
have the option of marriage. Because marriage and domestic partnership 
are different in both obligations and benefits, the possibility exists for an 
equal protection challenge. One author has noted that "[f]rom the 
liberation perspective, requiring marriage for benefit eligibility discrimi-
nates against all unmarried couples, whether homosexual or heterosexu-
al"66 and has concluded that "[u]ntil unmarried heterosexual partners 
are routinely included, the recognition of domestic partners will not 
constitute a radical redefinition of family.''67 
And so it was that in 1991 Montefiore Medical Center in Bronx, New 
York, became the "largest private employer in the nation to provide the 
same health benefits for homosexual workers and their partners as for 
heterosexual employees and their husbands or wives.',68 The hospital 
required that gay and lesbian couples prove that their living arrange-
ments were similar to those of married couples: cohabitation, joint 
accounts, proof of :financial interdependence, and a sworn statement from 
the two people that they were "each other's sole domestic partner.''69 
The partnership arrangement was limited to those whci are unable to 
marry because of laws prohibiting marriage of persons of the same 
sex.70 
Some companies were forced to extend domestic partnership benefits. 
For instance, Woodward & Lothrop, a large department store in the 
Washington, D.C. area, offered discount benefits to employees' 
unmarried partners if the employee would sign a statement of :financial 
interdependence.71 This would be available to both heterosexual and 
homosexual partners. Likewise, a Virginia Marriott health club and the 
65. A publication offering strategies for negotiating with employers is titled 
NEGOTIATING FOR EQUAL BENEFITS. See supra note 62. 
66. Badgett, supra note 8, at 28. 
67. Id. 
68. Barron, supra note 10, at Al. 
69. Id. 
70. Id. Three foreign governments have provided for marriage by persons of the 
same sex: Norway, Sweden, and Denmark. A Swede Deal for Couples, ADVOCATE, 
July 12, 1994, at 16. 
71. See Leigh Jackson, Woodies to Extend Benefits: Unmarried Partners to Get 
Discounts, WASH. POST, Feb. 15, 1990, at El. 
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American Automobile Association in Potomac, Maryland, provided 
partnership benefits upon being sued for discriminatory treatment 
involving marriage and partnership. 72 These companies, like others, 
settled the case by offering the benefits requested before the suit could 
be brought to court. 
Smaller companies, perhaps more cost conscious of health and leave 
benefits, have nonetheless provided domestic partnership benefits. For 
instance, in 1991, Lotus Development Corporation allowed homosexual 
employees who have "long-term" partners to sign contracts to qualify 
them for the same benefits offered to employees' married spouses.73 
Ben and Jerry's ice cream is another small business providing domestic 
partnership benefits.74 Cost concerns for these smaller companies are 
associated with fear of catastrophic medical expenses. This fear is AIDS 
generated. Negotiation with Lotus was illustrative: "The company 
required 'some educating,' for example, on costs. The discussions 
'danced,' ... around certain topics, like catastrophic illness: 'We kept 
saying, Is it AIDS? Nobody would say the word AIDS. "'75 But fear 
of a cost burden has not materialized.76 Indeed, at least two health 
insurance companies have extended domestic partnership benefits to their 
employees: .Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Massachusetts and Kaiser 
Permanente of Northern California.77 
Employers also fear that employees will falsely claim someone as a 
domestic partner. 78 In addition, there are added administrative costs 
due to Internal Revenue Code regulations. Because the employer's 
contribution to the health benefit policy of the domestic partner is treated 
as ordinary income to the employee, there is a taxable event that must 
72. Jill Walker, Va. Health Club, AAA Bow to Gay Couple's Bid for Discount, 
WASH. POST, June 15, 1991, at BS. 
73. Lotus Offers Benefits for Homosexual Pairs, N.Y: TIMES, Sept 7, 1991, § 1, 
at 12. 
74. Barbara P. Noble, A Quiet Liberation for Gay and Lesbian Employees, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 13, 1993, § 3, at 4. 
75. Barbara P. Noble, Benefits for Domestic Partners, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 1992, 
§ 3, at 23. 
76. When Berkeley, California extended medical benefits to live-in partners of 
employees, many predicted that insurance costs for the municipality would rise 
dramatically. This has not occurred. Smoking and exercise are better predictors of who 
will file insurance claims. Claudia H. Deutsch, Insurance for Domestic Partners, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 28, 1991, § 3, at 23. 
77. Badgett, supra note 8, at 30. 
78. Id. at 28-29. 
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be addressed. This is unique to domestic partners and not to married 
couples because the Internal Revenue Code specifically exempts married 
couples from the ordinary income aspect. 79 
Homophobia is another fear. Businesses and political entities are 
subject to the same social pressures as individuals. As domestic 
partnerships are, by implication or specific directive, associated with 
homosexuals, any business or political base is subject to bias against gay 
and lesbian persons.so Fear of public reaction may have prompted 
some of the larger companies to delay implementation of domestic 
partnerships. Yet, it is interesting to note, most of these companies have 
limited the partnerships to persons of the same sex. 
Schools and universities are particularly sensitive to homophobic 
pressures because of the necessity of soliciting contributions from donors 
and operating budgets from state legislatures.s1 Nonetheless, "by the 
end of [1994], every Ivy League university will provide domestic partner 
benefits for same-sex partners."s2 State universities are more vulnera-
ble to political pressures, but domestic partnerships exist at the 
Universities of Minnesota, Iowa, Vermont, the City University of New 
York, and Rutgers,83 and a number of others are discussing the 
issue.84 Stanford University, for example, provides benefits for both 
heterosexual and homosexual couples, and student benefits are different 
79. One company, HBO, includes the value of the benefits to an employee's 
taxable wages in his or her annual W-2 fonn. In 1993, this cost was estimated to be 
about $1,300 in taxes and health-plan contributions for an employee making $50,000. 
Barbara P. Noble, HBO Grants Bene.fits to Staff's Same-Sex Partners, N.Y. TIMES, July 
2, 1993, at D3. "Signing up a domestic partner for health and dental coverage adds as 
much as $3,880 to a Harvard employee's taxable income, for instance, increasing income 
tax payments and possibly even FICA payments." Badgett, supra note 8, at 29. 
80. For instance, for twelve years the mayors of Burlington, Vennont, were at least 
liberal, if not actually socialist. Yet Burlington elected its first Republican mayor in 
three decades in 1993 because of the Democrat's "advocacy of a plan to extend health-
care coverage to the unmarried partners of city employees." Health Plan Blamed in 
Vermont Mayor's Loss, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1993, § 1, at 29 [hereinafter Health]. But 
see Ian Fisher, Cuomo Decides to Extend Domestic-Partner Bene.fits, N.Y. TIMES, June 
29, 1994, at B4. Reporting that two weeks earlier Vennont became the first state to 
extend health and dental insurance to unmarried homosexual and heterosexual partners. 
81. For example, at Ohio State University, a proposal for same-sex couples to live 
in married student housing was met with so much opposition the state legislators are 
considering legislation that would prohibit this. Maria Newman, Rutgers Sued/or Ban 
on Health Bene.fits to Gay Partners, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 1994, at B4. 
82. Badgett, supra note 8, at 26-27. The author estimates that "[t]wenty-four 
colleges and universities offer health care benefits to .lesbian and gay employees' 
domestic partners--at least five also recognize opposite-sex partners." Id. at 26. 
83. Rutgers provided benefits to same-sex partners after five gay and lesbian 
students sued the university and the State of New Jersey. See Newman, supra note 81, 
at B4. 
84. Badgett, supra note 8, at 27. 
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from those extended to employees. At Stanford, "[t]o share a university 
apartment with a partner and use the library or the gym, students must 
have 'an established long-term domestic partnership with a mutual 
commitment similar to that of marriage' and 'share the necessities of life 
and responsibility for their common welfare. "'85 Smith and Dartmouth 
colleges require same-sex couples to pledge they would marry if legally 
allowed to do so. 86 
Without the statutory or common law formalities of marriage, 
businesses and universities have established their own guidelines as to 
what_ constitutes the status of domestic partnership. Typical elements of 
domestic partnership include: 
(1) Minimum time requirements, either before a partner is eligible for 
benefits or between partnerships if one is dissolved. Time requirements range 
from no requirement . . . to twelve months. 
(2) Evidence of financial interdependence, particularly shared assets and 
debts; 
(3) Sharing a joint residence, whether rented or owned; 
(4) Boundaries for the relationship, including exclusivity, no close blood 
relationship, and no current legal marriage; 
(5) Naming the partner as a beneficiary of life insurance or pension 
plans.87 
Because none of these is a product of government regulation or 
oversight, businesses and universities are able to change them at will. 
It is safe to assume that the requirements shall continue to modify as the 
practice becomes more common. Also, litigation concerning discrimina-
tion, privacy, freedom of association, and equal protection will have a 
significant impact upon eventual uniformity. · 
B. The Political Community 
During the mid-1980s, Berkeley, California, became the first American 
municipality to offer medical benefits to a live-in partner of either a 
85. Stanford: Giving Benefits and Apartments to Gay Couples, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
14, 1990, § l, at 39. More recently, Stanford extended health and dental benefits to 
same-sex domestic partners and "[p ]artners will also be able to audit university classes, 
their children will qualify for tuition grant programs, and the partners will qualify for 
library and athletics privileges." Anthony DePalma, Benefits Granted to Gay Partners, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 1992, at Al3. 
86. Badgett, supra note 8, at 29. 
87. Id. Also, compare these elements with those required for status of marriage; 
see supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
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homosexual or heterosexual employee.88 Since then additional munici-
palities have also done so: Madison, Wisconsin; Seattle, Washington;89 
and Cambridge, Massachusetts to name a few. These steps demonstrate 
that domestic partnership benefits have national applicability.90 These 
American cities reflect a trend evidenced in the 1990 census that 
reported 4.9 million unmarried-partner households in the United States. 
These couples, whether homosexual or heterosexual, are seeking legal 
and economic benefits without the obligations of marriage. They have 
found that living wills, durable powers of attorney, and valid last wills 
and testaments do not provide the security necessary at illness or death, 
and that while living and well, there are insufficient benefits to ratify 
what the partners believe is a functioning family. 
Larger cities have now adopted similar domestic partnership benefits. 
For instance, one is New York City, the city around which the historic 
Braschi case was centered. In that case, Miguel Braschi, 32, a hair salon 
manager, filed suit in 1987 against Stahl Associates, a real estate firm 
that sought to evict him after his lover, Leslie Blanchard, died of 
AIDS.91 They had shared the apartment for ten years. In a four to two 
ruling, the New York Court of Appeals recognized a new definition of 
family: "[A] family includes two adult lifetime partners whose 
relationship is long term and characterized by an emotional and financial 
commitment and interdependence."92 This allowed for the surviving 
partner to inherit the rent-controlled apartment. In the year of the 
decision, 1989, Mayor Edward Koch ordered ''paid bereavement leave 
88. Deutsch, supra note 76, § 3, at 23. 
89. In Seattle, for instance, 476 of the city's 10,000 employees were registered as 
domestic partners and an estimated 70% .of them were heterosexual. Kevin Sack, Albany 
to Let Insurance Law Cover Partners, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 1993, at Bl, B10. 
90. See also In 2 Cities, Unmarried Get Marriage Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 
1992, at B9 (Cambridge, Mass. and Sacramento, Cali£); Susan Scherreik, The Practical 
Part of Living Together, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 1993, § 1, at 33 (Denver, Colo.); Health, 
supra note 80, § 1, at 29. But see Lilly v. City of Minneapolis, Nos. C6-94-1583, C8-
94-1584, CX94-1585, 1995 Minn. App. LEXIS 120 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 1995) 
(holding that a grant of health care benefits to persons related to or living with a 
municipal employee is a matter of statewide concern and Minneapolis' resolution 
granting insurance benefits to same-sex domestic partners and an expansive list of 
relatives not defined as dependents independently is ultra vires and without legal force). 
91. Marianne Yen, Court Adds Gay Couple to Definition of Family, WASH. POST, 
July 7, 1989, at A3. 
92. Braschi v. Stahl Assocs. Co., 543 N.E.2d 49, 54 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1989); see also 
In re Guardianship of Kowalski, 478 N.W.2d 790 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (awarding 
guardianship of Kowalski to her lesbian partner of four years rather than her relatives, 
as this is what the severely injured Kowalski would have wanted). Both cases 
incorporate an expanded definition of family. But see Ross v. Denver Dep't of Health 
& Hosp., 883 P.2d 516 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994) (recognizing the .distinctive status of 
marriage as providing benefits under a state's definition of immediate family). 
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be granted to New York City employees who live as unmarried couples, 
homosexual or heterosexual, when their partners or partners' close 
family members die."93 The New York City Council did not expand 
the benefits even though legislation was introduced.94 
In 1993, Mayor David Dinkins, signed an executive order creating a 
city registry in which city residents or nonresident municipal workers 
who live together could register as unmarried domestic partners.95 This 
was a significant development for the city. Registration costs $20 and 
the parties must complete a notarized affidavit; the affidavit can be 
terminated for $15. The benefits vary: 
Some couples have used their new status to obtain discount prices for health 
club memberships and car rentals. One· woman, armed with the domestic 
partner certificate, confronted a funeral parlor that had refused to accept her as 
a close relative. She was then allowed to make future funeral arrangements for 
her ill partner. Many other couples have used their new status to make 
symbolic, political points about their sexuality.96 
The change in New York City came about in part because of the 
change in New York State. "Reversing a 54-year-old policy, the Cuomo 
administration ... lifted New York State's prohibition against providing 
family health insurance that covers the domestic partners of homosexuals 
and unmarried heterosexuals."97 Referring to the 1989 Braschi 
decision, state administrators accepted domestic partners as a family and 
provided for a standard of interdependence to determine the existence of 
93. David W. Dunlap, Koch Grants Paid Leave to Unmarried Couples, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 8, 1989, at B3. 
94. Felicia R. Lee, Bill Would Give Unwed Couples Equal Benefits, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 21, 1990, at B2. · 
95. Alan Finder, Rights of 'Domestic Partners' Broadened by Dinkins Order, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 8, 1993, at Al. Six weeks after the order became effective, 109 couples had 
registered, 3 were heterosexual. Jonathan P. Hicks, A Legal Threshold Is Crossed By 
Gay Couples in New York, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 1993, at Al. But by the end of 1993, 
over 1400 couples had registered. Mireya Navarro, New York Extends Health Benefits 
to Domestic Partners of City Employees, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 1993, at Bl. The 
Executive Order settled a lawsuit brought against the city in 1988 by the Lesbian and 
Gay Teachers Association alleging discrimination. Sack, supra note 89, at BIO; Gay 
Benefits Issue to Go to Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 1991, § 1, at 24; see Philip S. Gutis, 
Gay Teachers Sue for Benefits for Longtime Companions, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 1989, at 
B2. 
96. Lynda Richardson, Proud, Official Partners, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 1993, § 1, 
at 37-38. · 
97. Sack, supra· note 89, at Bl. But see Kevin Sack, Albany G.O.P. Grappling 
with Gay Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 1993, § 1, at 23. 
183 
the partnership. In June 1994, Governor Cuomo announced that he 
would extend insurance benefits to domestic partners of gay and lesbian 
employees.98 At present, the benefits are contemplated only for 
homosexual couples, since "opposite-sex partners have other options."99 
New York City extended health benefits to both homosexual and 
heterosexual domestic partners at the end of1993.100 
Other efforts to establish domestic partnerships within the political 
community have not met with the equanimity of New York. For 
instance, allowing for heterosexual and homosexual domestic partners to 
register in San Francisco, California in 1989, resulted in a city referen-
dum.101 In addition, for the third consecutive year, the U.S. House of 
Representatives has prohibited the government of the District of 
Columbia from using any money to implement its domestic partnership 
law. 102 Furthermore, by an overwhelming margin, the voters of 
Austin, Texas, repealed a municipal domestic partnership ordinance on 
May 7, 1994.103 
Recent political advances by the gay and lesbian community, as well 
as media attention given to President Clinton's efforts to end the ban on 
gays and lesbians in the military, have resulted in a number of anti-gay 
initiatives throughout the country. 104 These initiatives take the form 
98. Fisher, supra note 80, at B4. "There are about 162,000 employees in the 
executive branch and in the state university system." Id. 
99. Id. 
100. See Navarro, supra note 95, at Bl; see Not Enough for Domestic Partners, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 1993, § 1, at 20 (suggesting that health care benefits be extended to 
city workers). 
101. See Cynthia Gomey, Making It Official: The Law & Live-Ins, WASH. POST, 
July 5, 1989, at Cl. The partnership came about through registration and allowed for 
hospital visitation rights, paid bereavement leave if the employer is the City of San 
Francisco, health insurance coverage for city employees' partners and "respect." See 
also Cynthia Gomey, Protest Impedes Partners Law, WASH. POST, July 7, 1989, at D3. 
Note: On September 12, 1994, Governor Pete Wilson vetoed domestic partner 
legislation which would have allowed 500,000 unmarried couples to register with the 
state. Jerry Gillam, Wilson Signs Bill Ending No-Pants Rules for Women, L.A. TIMES, 
Sept. 12, 1994, at Al. 
102. Kristina Campbell, Three Times is Not the Charm for D. C. 's Partners Measure, 
WASH. BLADE, July 15, 1994, at AS. The District of Columbia measure would allow 
cohabiting unmarried adults over the age of 18 to register with the city; health benefits 
would be allowed for city employees. Washington Ordinance Tests Congress, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 10, 1992, at Al5; Domestic partnerships Backed in Washington, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 4, 1992, at A14; Kent Jenkins, Jr., House Panel Affirms D.C. Partnership 
Law, WASH. POST, June 11, 1992, at C3; Maggie S. Tucker, D.C. Domestic Partners Go 
On the Record Despite Law's Limits, WASH. POST, June 29, 1993, at Bl. 
103. John Gallagher, Partnership Disagreement, ADVOCATE, June 14, 1994, at 22. 
104. See generally Zamansky, supra note 53; Suzanne Goldberg, Pre-election 
Challenges: A Powerful Weapon Against Anti-Gay Initiatives, 11 LAMBDA UPDATE I 
(1994). 
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of measures placed on ballots asking the voters to rescind state laws or 
allow for a state constitutional amendment repealing any existing laws 
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. The state 
constitutional amendment in Colorado provides: 
Neither the State of Colorado, through any of its branches or departments, nor 
any of its agencies, political subdivisions, municipalities or school districts, 
shall enact, adopt or enforce any statute, regulation, ordinance or policy 
whereby homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or 
relationships shall constitute or otherwise be the basis of, or entitle any person 
or class of persons to have or claim and minority status, quota preferences, 
protected status or claim of discrimination. This Section of the Constitution 
shall be in all respects self-executing. 105 
Similar efforts have been introduced in other American political 
communities: Oregon, Idaho, Washington, Missouri, Maine, Florida, 
Nevada, and Michigan. Some of these efforts were at the state level and 
some were directed towards municipalities; many were organized by the 
U.S. Citizens Alliance or the Traditional Values Coalition. They 
contribute in part to a growing political controversy involving, in 
general, individual versus community standards, and in particular, private 
partnerships between two adults which may include sexual conduct. 
III. THE LEGAL CONTROVERSY 
A. In Opposition 
There were very few objections to the California Supreme Court's 
Marvin decision in 1976 which allowed recovery under a theory of 
contract for persons living in a meretricious relationship.106 And, other 
than objections concerning the practical application, there were very few 
objections to the New York Court of Appeals' Braschi decision in 1989 
which allowed a homosexual lover to inherit the deceased lover's rent 
control as a surviving family member.107 Perhaps it was because in 
both cases, the relationship was over and there was no further opportuni-
ty for sex. Not true for domestic partnership. There has been significant 
105. COLO. CONST. art. II, § 30b. 
106. See Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 
(1976); see also supra notes 14-19 and accompanying text. 
107. Braschi v. Stahl Assocs. Co., 543 N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1989); see supra 
text accompanying notes 92-94. 
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opposition to both heterosexual and homosexual partnership, and 
particular vehemence over all gay-rights measures. 108 
The basis for the opposition can result from bigotry, fear of AIDS, 
discrimination, or ignorance. Many people believe that a gay or lesbian 
person chooses his or her lifestyle, a lifestyle that is often distorted by 
media coverage of such events as Gay Pride parades, and since that 
lifestyle is different from assumed national values, efforts to prohibit it 
result. An example is found in the comments of New York State 
Senator John R. Kuhl, Jr., concerning a future vote on a pending gay-
rights bill in New York: 
I don't condone their lifestyle. I think it's their choice and they have to live 
with it. I look at it different than an Italian person or blacks or Chinese, people 
who have genetic traits that they can't do anything about. Sexual orientation 
is their choice and I don't think it's our place to force people that might have 
a moral opposition to it to have to put up with .it and condone it.109 
But then there are motives for supporting anti-gay initiatives that arise 
because of rational religious interpretation, a perceived value of cultural 
uniformity, or an ardent belief that such liberties as domestic partnership 
in particular, or gay-rights in general, are bad for America. 110 Thus, 
in Idaho in 1993, the Idaho Citizens Alliance proposed an initiative for 
the voters providing: 
Section 67-8002: SPECIAL RIGHTS FOR PERSONS WHO ENGAGE IN HOMOSEXUAL 
BEHAVIOR PROHIBITED. No agency, department, or political subdivision of the 
State of Idaho shall enact or adopt any law, rule, policy, or agreement which 
has the purpose or effect of granting minority status to persons who engage in 
homosexual behavior, solely on the basis of such behavior; therefore, 
affirmative action, quota preferences, and special classifications such as 'sexual 
orientation' or similar designations shall not be established on the basis of 
homosexuality . . . . 
Section 67-8003: EXTENSION OF LEGAL INSTITUTION OF MARRIAGE TO 
DoMESTIC PARTNERSHIPS BASED-ON HOMOSEXUAL BEHAVIOR PROHIBITED. 
Same-sex marriages and domestic partnerships are hereby declared to be against 
public policy and shall not be legally recognized -in any manner by an agency, 
department, or political subdivision of the State of Idaho. 111 
108. See Bettina Boxall, Anti-Gay-Rights Measures Ignite Aggressive Battles in 7 
States, L.A. TIMES, June 9, 1994, at A5. 
109. Sack, supra note 97, § 1, at 23; see also Titus, supra note 18, at 339-40 
(arguing the mistaken belief that all people are free to have sex with whomever they 
please). 
110. The rationality of arguments concerning, for example, gay and lesbian parents, 
sexual molestation, and psychosexual orientation are recent and continue to develop. 
See, e.g., Flaks, supra note 27. 
111. ACLU v. Echohawk, 857 P.2d 626, 627-28 (Idaho 1993). 
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Also in 1993, in Oregon, Lon T. Mabon, of the Oregon Citizens 
Alliance, submitted an initiative for the ballot which would amend the 
state constitution to provide: 
Section 41: MINORITY STATUS BASED ON HOMOSEXUALITY PROHIBITED. 
(1) In the State of Oregon, including all political subdivisions and 
government units, minority status shall not apply to homosexuality; therefore, 
affirmative action, quotas, special class status or special classifications such as 
"sexual orientation," "domestic partnerships" or similar designations shall not 
be established on the basis of homosexuality. 
[(2)](a) The State of Oregon, political subdivisions and all units of state and 
local government shall not grant marital status or spousal benefits on the basis 
of homosexuality. 112 
In California the Riverside Citizens for Responsible Behavior sought 
to place the following initiative on the ballot in 1991: 
(3) City shall not enact any policy or law which "defines homosexuality, 
bisexuality, sexual orientation, affectional preference, or gay or lesbian conduct 
as a fundamental human right;" . . . or "promotes, encourages, endorses, 
legitimizes or justifies homosexuality." 
(5) "No City monies may be used directly or indirectly to fund any 
individual, activity or organization which promotes, encourages, endorses, 
legitimizes or justifies homosexual conduct." 13 
These state initiatives often had parallel activity at the more local 
level. In Marietta, Georgia, the Cobb County Board of Commissioners 
passed a resolution condemning homosexuality and eliminating $110,000 
in arts funding in its 1994 budget.114 The Board's action was precipi-
tated by a resident writing to a commissioner to complain about 
references to homosexuality in a play at Theater in the Square. The 
Board decided that "the life styles advocated by the gay community" 
were incompatible with Cobb County standards. 115 Likewise, Commis-
sioners of Williamson County, Texas, refused to give a real estate tax 
112. Mabon v. Keisling, 856 P.2d 1023, 1024 (Or. 1993); see DeParrie v. Keisling, 
862 P.2d 494 (Or. 1993). 
113. Citizens for Responsible Behavior v. Superior Court, 1 Cal. App. 4th 1013, 
1019-20, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 648,651 (1991) (holding that the initiative was constitutionally 
defective and refusing to place the initiative on the ballot). 
114. Peter Applebome, County's Anti-Gay Move Catches Few By Surprise, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 29, 1993, § 1, at 18. 
115. Id. 
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abatement to Apple Computer, Inc. which planned to build an $80 
million office complex on a patch of land just above Austin. The 
Commissioners cited Apple's policy of domestic partnership which 
grants health benefits to partners of gay and lesbian employees as the 
reason for refusing the tax abatement.116 
The vehemence of the opponents to domestic partnership in general, 
and gay and lesbian rights in particular, presage future initiatives, 
litigation, and animosity. Yet, the visibility and the concommitant 
discussion----even though expensive and litigious---contribute to a sense 
of identity for the gay and lesbian community and to a greater under-
standing of the homosexual person by the heterosexual community. This 
is a significant contribution to the development of any due process rights 
in the future. 117 
B. In Defense 
Organizations such as the Americans for Civil Liberties Union and the 
Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund have been persistent, and 
most recently successful, in the defense of liberties on behalf of gays 
and lesbians. Included among these liberties is domestic partnership. 
Defenses advocated by litigators are as practical as organizing at the 
local political level for legislative relief; defenses include the gamut of 
federal and state constitutional guarantees which assist minority 
communities such as gays and lesbians. Following the 1986 landmark 
sodomy case of Bowers v. Hardwick, 118 academics, commentators, and 
litigators devoted increased attention towards these and other constitu-
tional guarantees in an effort to expand the rights of gay and lesbian 
persons. 119 Today, litigation defenses would include rights to priva-
cy, 120 Equal Rights Amendments (ERA), 121 state statutes prohibiting 
116. Apple Denied a Tax Break, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 1993, at D7; Sam H. 
Verhovek, County in Texas Snubs Apple Over Unwed-Partner Policies, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 2, 1993, at Al. Later, the county commissioners would have another vote and 
change their minds. 
117. For a discussion of the necessity of a due process argument for the gay and 
lesbian community, see infra notes 152-210 and accompanying text. 
118. 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (holding that the due process clause of the United States 
Constitution did not confer on homosexuals a fundamental right to engage in sodomy). 
119. See generally Cain, supra note 55. 
120. See, e.g.; Hohengarten, supra note 28 (arguing that state has an affirmative 
duty to remove obstacles to same-sex marriage so that gay and lesbian persons may 
enjoy the privacy of this fundamental relationship); see also Commonwealth v. Wasson, 
842 S.W.2d 487, 488 (Ky. 1992) (deciding that the state's sodomy statute violated the 
state's guarantee of privacy). 
121. See, e.g., Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993) (using the Hawaii Equal 
Rights Amendment to raise the level of judicial scrutiny to strict under equal protection 
188 
[VOL. 32: 163, 1995] Domestic Partnership 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
discrimination, 122 the First Amendment, 123 and, the two which fol-
low, equal protection and due process of law. 
1. Equal Protection 
One commentator has explained the equal protection defense: "If 
homosexuals, as a class, are treated differently from other classes of 
persons, then the state must justify the differential treatment in the same 
way the state must justify classifications based on race and sex."124 In 
spite of initial setbacks, there have been recent successes. 
For instance, in Cammermeyer v. Aspin,125 an Army colonel who had 
served admirably as a nurse and then in the National Guard from 1961 
until 1992 was discharged because she admitted being a lesbian, but she 
did not admit to any sexual conduct with women. In Spring, 1994, the 
federal district court in Washington held that the army regulation 
banning persons who merely acknowledge homosexual orientation was 
not rationally related to the government's legitimate interest in maintain-
ing readiness and combat effectiveness of military forces, and therefore 
violated the equal protection guarantee of the Fifth Amendment.126 
This case forms another element in the saga of lifting the ban against 
gays and lesbians in the military.127 Its effect, however, has yet to be 
analysis); Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974) (deciding that the state 
Equal Rights Amendment was inapplicable to change the basic definition of marriage). 
122. See, e.g., Dean v. District of Columbia, 18 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 1387 (D.C. 
Super. Ct. June 2, 1992), aff'd, No. 92-CN-737, 1995 WL 21117 (D.C. Ct. App. Jan. 19, 
1995) (deciding that statutes were inapplicable to change the definition of marriage). 
123. See generally Hunter, supra note 56. 
124. Cain, supra note 55, at 1617-18; see also John F. Niblock,Anti-Gay Initiatives: 
A Call for Heightened Judicial Scrutiny, 41 UCLA L. REV. 153 (1993) (advocating 
heightened judicial scrutiny for gay and lesbian persons in conjunction with an equal 
protection argument); Janet E. Halley, The Politics of the Closet: Towards Equal 
Protection for Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Identity, 36 UCLA L. REV. 915 (1989). 
125. Cammermeyer v. Aspin, 850 F. Supp. 910 (W.D. Wash. 1994). 
126. See id. at 929. 
127. See, e.g., Pruitt v. Cheny, 963 F.2d 1160 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. 
Ct. 665 (1992) (requiring the Army to offer a rational basis for a regulation discharging 
an officer for her acknowledgement that she was a lesbian); Watkins v. United States 
Army, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989) (en bane) (granting equal protection relief because 
the Army denied the plaintiff equal protection of the laws by discharging him and . 
refusing to reenlist him solely on the basis of his homosexuality); BenShalom v. Marsh, 
703 F. Supp. 1372 (E.D. Wis. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1004 (1990) (holding that 
exclusion of service members for homosexual status alone without concurrent conduct 
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tested on appeal. 128 
Professor Patricia Cain writes that, "the greatest hope for equal 
protection in furthering gay and lesbian rights is that a court, in applying 
rational basis review, will require the state to offer proof that the 
discriminatory rule is indeed rational."129 This is an aggressive policy 
of rationality; the military must submit actual evidence of the rationality 
of its policies.13° For instance, in Cammermeyer, the court ruled that 
the lesbian colonel who was discharged because of her admission of 
homosexual orientation met her burden of proof to negate the military's 
proffered justification for its ban on gay and lesbian soldiers. 131 Thus, 
the court held that she had "met her burden of negating the proffered 
justifications for the government's policy ... [and] [t]he Government 
[had] failed to offer any evidence ... that its justifications [were] based 
on anything but prejudice . . . . The government [had] discriminated 
against [her] . . . and ... [had] failed to demonstrate a rational basis for 
doing so."132 
The equal protection argument involves a careful analysis. That is, 
when subjecting laws to analysis under equal protection, what level of 
proof must the court apply? There are three possibilities: a rational 
basis, a quasi-suspect class, often associated with gender discrimina-
tion,133 and a strict approach, most often associated with racial classifi-
is not rationally related to any articulated legitimate government interest). 
128. Other opinions in favor of applying strict scrutiny to the military ban against 
gays and lesbians have been reversed on appeal. See Jantz v. Muci, 759 F. Supp. 1543 
(D. Kan. 1991), rev'd, 976 F.2d 623 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2445 
(1993). 
129. Cain, supra note 55, at 1620. This is an active rational review process, 
thereby forcing the military to justify the exclusion through evidence. See Buttino v. FBI, 
801 F. Supp. 298, 308 (N.D. Cal. 1992). 
130. Recent cases evidence success with this policy of active rational basis review. 
See, e.g., Pruitt v. Cheney, 963 F.2d I 160 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 655 
(1992) (court held that military policies that simply give effect to society's prejudices 
do not suffice under a rational basis test); Meinhold v. United States Dep't of Defense, 
808 F. Supp. 1455 (C.D. Cal. 1993) (citing the equal protection claim of the plaintiff, 
the court held that a policy of exclusion cannot simply defer to the military judgment 
as sufficient, but must consider the factual basis as rational). 
131. Cammermeyer, 850 F. Supp. at 924. To meet this burden the court accepted 
evidence of President Clinton's statements, the presence of homosexuals serving in the 
military, and a RAND Report stating that homosexuals will not affect military cohesion 
and that public disapproval of homosexuals in the military is not a valid concern. 
132. Id. at 924, 926. The case had been stayed pending President Clinton's attempt 
to change the policy on the ban. 
133. District Judge Thelton Henderson ruled that lesbian and gay litigants 
constituted a quasi-suspect class for equal protection purposes, but his decision was 
overruled on appeal. High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 668 F. 
Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1987), rev'd, 895 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1990). For arguments that 
gays and lesbians deserve strict scrutiny, see Zamansky, supra note 53, at 251-54; 
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cations, which requires the state to prove a compelling state interest. 134 
One author argues that since the due process clause has been primarily 
used to protect ''traditional" substantive rights from the short term 
intrusion of elected majorities, 135 and homosexuals do not engage in 
traditional conduct, equal protection requires a "heightened justification" 
for state discrimination against those engaged in such conduct. 136 
Others have continued to develop sexual arguments for heightened 
scrutiny, 137 but the possibilities are not good. 138 Instead, the argu-
ment used is likely to be that of Cammermeyer: 
Initially, the court must determine whether the challenged classification serves 
a legitimate governmental purpose. If the court answers this question in the 
affirmative, the court must then determine whether the discriminatory 
classification is rationally related to the achievement of that legitimate purpose. 
A discriminatory classification that is based on prejudice or bias is not rational 
as a matter of law. 139 
It is important to note that Cammermeyer concerned the status of the 
lesbian colonel as a person who had simply announced her sexual 
orientation as homosexual. Conduct was not at issue. 140 However, 
because of the adverse ruling in Bowers v. Hardwick, 141 homosexual 
Niblock, supra note 124, at 167-77. 
134. But see Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (Justices Brennan, 
Douglas, White, and Marshall held that sex is a suspect classification requiring strict 
scrutiny). 
135. See Sunstein, supra note 55, at 1174. 
136. Id. 
137. See, e.g., Niblock, supra note 124; Trosino, supra note 28 (making an 
argument of similarity to racial classifications). But see Singer v. Hara, 522 P .2d 1187 
(Wash. 1979) ( explaining that the court would have applied strict judicial scrutiny if it 
had found sexual discrimination); Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993) (requiring 
state to provide a compelling state interest to justify its gender classification prohibiting 
same-sex marriage). 
138. But see Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993) (remanding to the lower 
court for a determination to assess the compelling state interest associated with 
prohibition of same-sex marriages). 
139. Cammermeyer, 850 F. Supp. at 915. , 
140. Id. at 918. Conduct has been defined as "any bodily contact, actively 
undertaken or passively permitted, between members of the same sex for the purpose of 
satisfying sexual desires or any bodily contact which a reasonable person would 
understand to demonstrate a propensity or intent to engage in homosexual acts." 
Memorandum from Les Aspin, Secretary of Defense, to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Policy 
on Homosexual Conduct in the Armed Forces, July 19, 1993, at 2. 
141. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). The Supreme Court ruled in a five to four opinion that 
homosexuals did not have a fundamental due process right to engage in sodomy. Id. at 
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conduct--sodomy--is without protection even though it could be argued 
that heterosexual soqomy would be protected under a right to priva-
cy.142 The adverse consequences of conduct and the legacy of Bowers 
v. Hardwick prompted judges to respond "to the equal protection claims 
of gay and lesbian litigants by saying that until Hardwick is reversed, no 
such claim can be recognized."143 In confronting this difficulty, 
"litigators have, whenever possible, distanced themselves from Hardwick 
by claiming that their clients have been victims of discrimination based 
on 'status' and by arguing that 'conduct' should not be presumed from 
status."144 This argument prevailed in Cammermeyer: "[T]o the extent 
the Government's policy is based on the unfounded presumption that 
servicemembers with a homosexual orientation will engage in proscribed 
homosexual conduct, the policy is not rationally based."145 It is 
therefore unconstitutional. 
It could be argued that when the Supreme Court of Hawaii remanded 
to the circuit court to determine if prohibition of same-sex couples from 
marrying violated equal protection of the law, 146 the court was reject-
ing unfounded presumptions. That is, the court wanted the circuit court 
to justify its reasons as to why persons of the same sex could not marry. 
This confrontation-aggressive rationality--over the exact nature of the 
reason for the denial of equal protection is an argument advocated by 
proponents of gay and lesbian rights. 147 Also implicit in the Hawaii 
decision is sexual conduct, not simply acknowledgement, even though 
the court specifically states the decision is not about homosexual rights, 
but rather about the rights of same-sex couples to marry.148 
Eventually, Bowers v. Hardwick may well be overturned. 149 Indeed, 
state legislatures are revoking sodomy statutes, 150 and in Kentucky, the 
state's highest court ruled that a state homosexual sodomy law violates 
196. 
142. Prior cases had found no privacy right for homosexuals to engage in sodomy. 
See, e.g., Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), aff'd, 
425 U.S. 901 (1976). 
143. Cain, supra note 55, at 1618. 
144. Id. at 1621-22. The author suggests that ''rational basis analysis ought to 
require more than mere conjecture." Id. at 1630. 
145. Cammermeyer, 850 F. Supp. at 925 (footnote omitted). 
146. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 77 (Haw. 1993). 
147. See supra text accompanying note 129. 
148. See infra text accompanying note 155. 
149. See generally Janet E. Halley, Reasoning About Sodomy: Act and Identity in 
and After Bowers v. Hardwick, 79 VA. L. REV. 1721 (1993). 
150. See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 201.190 (Michie 1993). Nevada is the exception 
in that after repealing its statute, it was reinstated in 1993. 
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the equal protection clause of that state's constitution. 151 Some gay 
and lesbian advocates argue for litigation strategies that would emphasize 
the inherent rights of gay and lesbian persons to engage in sexual 
conduct as a due process right, while simultaneously challenging class-
based discrimination based on equal protection.152 This strategy would 
place more emphasis upon the lifestyle of the gay or lesbian person, 
greater emphasis upon the immutable characteristic of the gay or lesbian 
sexual orientation, and greater acknowledgement of the values inherent 
in the person, even though he or she is homosexual. Of course, these 
forays are affected by developments concerning domestic partnership. 
Surely if domestic partnership incorporates responsibilities as well as 
benefits, due process between gay and lesbian partners will be advanced. 
2. Due Process 
If equal protection argues that gay and lesbian persons cannot be 
prosecuted or denied benefits of a law that exempts heterosexuals or 
provides services to heterosexuals without at least a rational basis, then 
due process argues for even more. That is, "[ s ]ubstantive due process 
arguments ... [involve] the fundamental importance of love, affection, 
intimacy, commitment, expressions of concern, and all other forms of 
conduct that lesbians and gay men embrace as part of their lesbian and 
gay lifestyle."153 Conduct is definitely involved, not simply status, and 
the central focus is on personhood. 154 
This ascendence of personhood and thus due process protection for 
homosexuals is in part due to the abolition of the sodomy laws; if 
Bowers v. Hardwick were specifically overruled it would make a 
significant difference. Under Bowers v. Hardwick, simply by determin-
ing a gay or lesbian status, a person is an assumed sodomite and thus, 
a criminal, "morally weak and thus unfit for employment in responsible 
151. See Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992). See also State 
v. Morales, 826 S.W.2d 201 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992) (invalidating the state's homosexual 
sodomy statute on the basis of the state's constitutional guarantee of privacy), rev'd, 869 
S.W.2d 941 (Tex. 1994). See generally Anne B. Goldstein, Reasoning About 
Homosexuality: A Commentary on Janet Halley's "Reasoning About Sodomy: Act and 
Identity in and After Bowers v. Hardwick", 79 VA. L. REV. 1781, 1789-98 (1993) 
(differentiating Michael Hardwick from Jeffrey Wasson). 
152. Cain, supra note 55, at 1628. 
153. Id. at 1635-36. 
154. For an excellent explanation of personhood, see Rubenfeld, supra note 11. 
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positions."155 "So long as gay men and lesbians were presumed to 
engage in acts of criminal sodomy, employers could argue that they 
should not be forced to hire criminals and landlords could argue that 
they should not be forced to rent to criminals."156 
With abolition of the sodomy statutes through legislative or judicial 
action, it is possible to address the due process rights of gays and 
lesbians. In other words, once the automatic criminal nexus is lifted 
from gays and lesbians---and recall that heterosexuals engage in sodomy 
too--the person of the gay and lesbian becomes the center of attention 
and this personhood can be recognized within due process.157 "If 
litigants continue to argue that the interests at stake are important, even 
if they are not 'fundamental,' then perhaps substantive due process 
claims would begin to enjoy a form of 'active' rational basis review 
similar to that available for equal protection claims."158 In part, this 
is why litigation over marriage is so important, it presages family, 159 
although it is more logical to think that once the idea of same-sex family 
takes hold, same-sex marriage may come next. 160 But the important 
thing is that persons begin to recognize that gays and lesbians are 
capable of forming families and thus are deserving of protection under 
due process. 
In Baker v. Nelson, 161 Richard Baker and James McConnell went to 
the courthouse to apply for a marriage license and their application was 
155. Cain, supra note 55, at 1587. For a recent story concerning a homosexual 
who lost his employment because of his sexual orientation, see James B. Stewart, Annals 
of Law: Gentleman's Agreement, NEW YORKER, June 13, 1994, at 74. 
156. Cain, supra note 55, at 1588. But see Smith v. Fair Employment & Hous. 
Comm'n, 25 Cal. App. 4th 251, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 395 (1994), rev. granted and opinion 
superseded by Smith v. Fair Employment & Rous. Comm'n, 880 P.2d 111, 33 Cal. Rptr. 
2d 567 (1994) (allowing a landlord to refuse to rent to an unmarried couple because it 
would implicate her in what she believes is the sin of sex outside of marriage); see also 
Attorney General v. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 233 (Mass. 1994) (holding that landlord need 
not comply with state statute barring marital status discrimination if compliance would 
violate religious beliefs and state cannot prove a compelling state interest). 
157. Biblical prohibitions cannot be as easily eradicated by many. See, e.g., Titus, 
supra note 18, at 342-43. 
158. Cain, supra note 55, at 1639-40. The Supreme Court has decided that the Due 
Process Clause of the Constitution does not confer on homosexuals a fundamental right 
to engage in sodomy. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190-91 (1986); see also 
Watkins v. United States Army, 875 F.2d 699, 718 (9th Cir. 1989) (en bane) (Norris, J., 
concurring), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 957 (1990). 
159. For arguments supporting alternative families in adoption, custody and foster 
care, see Russman, supra note 28. See generally William B. Rubenstein, We Are 
Family: A Reflection on the Search for Legal Recognition of Lesbian and Gay 
Relationships, 8 J.L. & POL. 89 (1991). 
160. See Eskridge, Jr., supra note 28, at 1432 (recommending starting with 
domestic partnership ordinances and working up to same-sex marriages over time). 
161. 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972). 
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denied by the clerk because they were of the same sex. The couple 
appealed the clerk's decision on due process grounds, but the court 
denied them their appeal, relying on the legal definition of marriage as 
that between persons of the opposite sex. 162 Furthermore, the court 
pointed out, "[t]he due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is 
not a charter for restructuring [marriage] by judicial legislation."163 
This was in the early seventies. 
In the early nineties, two District of Columbia men were denied a 
marriage license and challenged the denial based on the District of 
Columbia marriage statute,164 the District of Columbia anti-discrimina-
tion ordinance, 165 and due process of law. The court stated that the 
"true due process inquiry involves not the fundamental nature of an 
abstract 'right to marry,' but rather, whether the constitution confers a 
fundamental right upon persons of the same sex to marry one anoth-
er."166 In rejecting their appeal, the District of Columbia Superior 
Court followed the definitional aspect of marriage as a societal 
recognition that it takes a man and a woman to form a marital relation-
ship. 167 Litigation continues on that case, but another case has caught 
the attention of legal scholars. This case occurs in Hawaii. 
162. The definitional response of the courts would be utilized in subsequent 
decisions. See Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974); De Santo v. 
Barnsley, 476 A.2d 952 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984) (two persons of the same sex cannot enter 
into a common law marriage). 
163. Baker, 191 N.W.2d at 186. 
164. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 30-101 to 121 (1981). 
165. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-2501 to 2533 (1981). 
166. Dean v. District of Columbia, 18 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 1387 (D.C. Super. Ct. 
June 2, 1992), ajf'd, No. 92-CV-737 1995 WL 21117 (D.C. Ct. App. Jan. 19, 1995). 
On January 19, 1995 the three judge panel of the District of Columbia Circuit Court of 
Appeals, the district's highest appellate court, ruled that the superior court was correct 
in upholding the city's refusal to grant a marriage license to two persons of the same 
sex. 
167. Id. The District of Columbia Superior Court, like other courts, linked its 
definitional authority to biblical references. References to Divine Providence also were 
included in the rationale for denying interracial marriages in Loving v. Virginia, 388 
U.S. 1, 3 (1966), where the court quoted the trial judge. See also Adams v. Howerton, 
486 F. Supp. 1119 (C.D. Cal. 1980), aff'd on other grounds, 673 F.2d 1036 (9th Cir. 
1982), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1111 (1992); Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 
1971), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972); Craig R. Dean, Legalize Gay Marriage, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 1991, § 1, at 19. 
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Baehr v. Lewin168 involved two women, Genora Dancel and Ninia 
Baehr, who challenged Hawaii's imposition of an "opposite-sex 
restriction" on their right to marry. They met all of the state require-
ments for marriage, but were denied a license because they were "both 
of the same sex and for this reason [were] not capable of forming a valid 
marriage contract within the meaning of [the law]."169 The plaintiffs 
then brought suit, claiming the following: (1) that the state's denial to a 
same-sex couple of access to marriage is a violation of the couple's right 
to privacy as guaranteed by the Hawaii Constitution;170 and (2) that the 
denial also is a violation of the right to equal protection of the law and 
due process of law as guaranteed by the Hawaii Constitution.171 
In addition, the plaintiffs asserted their homosexuality and claimed a 
fundamental constitutional right to sexual orientation.17 
The circuit court dismissed plaintiff's complaint, finding that: "{l) 
[denial of the license to the plaintiffs] 'does not infringe upon a person's 
individuality or lifestyle decisions"' and "(2) [denial] 'does not ... 
burden ... the ... right to engage in a homosexual lifestyle. "'173 In 
addition, the circuit court found that: 
(5) . . . "[T]here is no evidence that homosexuals and the homosexual 
legislative agenda have failed to gain legislative support ... "; (6) the 
"[p]laintifls have failed to show that homosexuals constitute a suspect class for 
equal protection analysis ... "; (7) ''the issue of whether homosexuality 
constitutes an immutable trait has generated much dispute in the relevant 
scientific community"; and (8) [the present law] "is obviously designed to 
promote the general welfare interests of the community by sanctioning 
traditional man-woman family units and procreation."174 
168. 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993). The lesbian couple was joined by a gay male 
couple and another lesbian couple in bringing the suit. Id. 
169. Id. at 50. See generally John E. Durkin, Comment, Reproductive Technology 
and the New Family: Recognizing the Other Mother, 10 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & 
POL'Y 327 (1994). 
170. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 50. Article I, § 6 of the Hawaii Constitution provides: 
"The right of the people to privacy is recognized and shall not be infringed without the 
showing of a compelling state interest. The legislature shall take affinnative steps to 
implement this right." HAW. CONST. art I,§ 6. 
171. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 50. Article I, § 5 of the Hawaii Constitution provides: ''No 
person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor be 
denied the equal protection of the laws, nor be denied the enjoyment of the person's civil 
rights or be discriminated against in the exercise thereof because of race, religion, sex 
or ancestry." HAW. CONST. art. I, § 5. 
172. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 52. 
173. Id. at 53 (quoting circuit court's order). The Hawaii Supreme Court held that 
"it is irrelevant, for purposes of the constitutional analysis gennane to this case, whether 
homosexuals constitute a 'suspect class' because it is immaterial whether the plaintiffs, 
or any of them, are homosexual." Id. at 58. 
174. Id. at 53-54 (footnote omitted) (quoting circuit court's order). 
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On appeal, the Supreme Court of Hawaii was asked to resolve the 
issues presented by the plaintiffs based upon the Hawaii Constitution. 
It is important to note that this case was brought in state court based on 
the interpretation of the state constitution. As in Kentucky v. 
Wasson, 175 where the state supreme court ruled that the state sodomy 
statute violated the state guarantee of equal protection, this is another 
instance where, "constitutional challenges in state courts may be more 
productive than federal challenges."176 
Although basing its opinion on Hawaii law, the court relied heavily on 
federal constitutional cases, especially those involved with the issue of 
whether or not there is a fundamental right to marry. For instance, the 
right to privacy is specifically enumerated in the state constitution and 
the court complemented this with a panorama of federal fundamental 
right to marry decisions. 177 The court concluded, "it would make little 
sense to recognize a right of privacy with respect to other matters of 
family life [procreation, childbirth, child rearing, and family relation-
ships] and not with respect to the decision to enter the relationship that 
is the foundation of the family in our society."178 Thus, do "same-sex 
couples possess a fundamental right" to marry?179 The court, in spite 
of its emphasis upon federal cases, decided that for purposes of privacy 
or otherwise: 
[W]e do not believe that a right to same-sex marriage is so rooted in the 
traditions and collective conscience of our people that failure to recognize it 
would violate the fundamental principles of liberty and justice that lie at the 
base of all our civil and political institutions. Neither do we believe that a right 
to same-sex marriage is implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that 
neither liberty nor justice would exist if it were sacrificed.180 
175. 842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992); see supra text accompanying note 145. Like 
Baehr, Wasson also applied heightened scrutiny to sexual orientation classifications. 
Wasson, 842 S.W.2d at_. 
176. Eskridge, Jr., supra note 28, at 1509. 
177. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 55-56. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); 
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978); Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1888); Meyer 
v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). But see Baehr, 852 P.2d at 59. States may and do 
prohibit marriage. The extent of these prohibitions suggests that further analysis must 
be done before marriage may be conclusively a fundamental right. 
178. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 56. 
179. Id. at 57. 
180. Id. 
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The court then addressed the equal protection argument. Since the 
authority to grant licenses to solemnize marriage, "on its face, discrimi-
nates based on sex against the applicant couples in the exercise of the 
civil right of marriage,"181 the equal protection clause of the Hawaii 
Constitution is implicated. This equal protection clause is more 
extensive than that of the United States Constitution. The Hawaii 
Constitution provides that: "no person shall . . . be denied the equal 
protection of the laws, nor be denied the enjoyment of the person's civil 
rights or be discriminated against in the exercise thereof because of race, 
religion, sex, or ancestry. "182 Thus, unlike the United States Constitu-
tion, "the Hawaii Constitution prohibits state-sanctioned discrimination 
against any person in the exercise of his or her civil rights on the basis 
of sex."183 But first the court had to address whether same-sex 
marriage was prohibited by the definition of marriage achieved through 
history. This is the definitional argument. 
The court did not find the definitional argument of previous cases 
dispositive. 184 Instead, the court implied that the equal protection 
analysis--federal or state--was not addressed, specifically in analogy to 
the Virginia miscegenation case of Loving v. Virginia. 185 In that 1966 
case, a Black woman and a Caucasian man were married in the District 
of Columbia and then returned to their home state of Virginia to 
establish their domicile. The couple was indicted for, and subsequently 
convicted of, violating Virginia's miscegenation statute, which banned 
interracial marriages. The Supreme Court of Virginia upheld their 
conviction and the couple appealed to the United States Supreme 
Court.186
For the Supreme Court, Loving was essentially an equal protection 
case, even though due process is mentioned briefly. 18 This equal 
protection argument in Loving also resulted from the definitional 
181. Id. at 59. 
182. Id. at 60 (quoting HAW. CONST. art. I,§ 5). 
183. Id. ("It is the state's regulation of access to the status of married persons, on 
the basis of the applicants' sex, that gives rise to the question whether the applicant 
couples have been denied the equal protection of the laws .... "). 
184. Id. at 60 n.20. But see Dean v. District of Columbia, 18 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 
1387 (D.C. Super. Ct. June 2, 1992), aff'd, No. 92-CV-737, 1995 WL 21117 (D.C. Ct. 
App. Jan. 19, 1995); Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974); Jones v. 
Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. Ct. App. 1973). 
185. 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding that anti-miscegenation laws violate the United 
State Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses); 
see also Trosino, supra note 28; Eskridge, Jr., supra note 28, at 1504 (Loving is a 
favorable analogy for those questioning state law prohibiting same-sex marriage). 
186. Loving, 388 U.S. at 3-4. 
187. Id. at 12. 
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impossibility of marriage between a Caucasian and anyone other than a 
Caucasian: "[I]nterracial marriage simply could not exist because the 
Deity had deemed such a union intrinsically unnatural,"188 and the 
customs of the state had never included it. Yet, applying strict scrutiny 
to the racial classification engendered into the miscegenation laws, the 
Court found no compelling reasons to maintain the past custom. 189 
Indeed, the Court found that customs had changed-former vestiges of 
slavery were disappearing during the sixties--and thus past custom 
should no longer dictate the definitional aspect of marriage. As to the 
will of the Deity, the Hawaiian court ratified what the Loving Court 
found as well: "[W]e do not believe that trial judges are the ultimate 
authorities on the subject of Divine Will .... "190 
The significance of Baehr therefore, is that it couples the racial 
prohibitions of Loving with the same-sex prohibitions of the Hawaii 
statute, and then finds that since customs changed for the former, why 
cannot customs change for the latter. If time allowed mixed-race 
couples to marry, time could allow same-sex couples to marry. This 
eliminates the argument of decisions that held that it was not a denial of 
equal protection, since marriage had never included within its definition, 
a same-sex union. This is the unique first step of Baehr, the elimination 
of the definitional argument; the second step will then be a consideration 
of whether or not it is in fact a denial of equal protection to refuse to 
allow marriages between persons of the same sex. But in order to do 
this, it is necessary to establish the standard by which to evaluate the 
state's claim. Must the state, under strict scrutiny, show a compelling 
state interest to justify the classification, or must the state simply show 
that the statute rationally furthers a legitimate state interest? 
Some sex classifications have demanded strict scrutiny;191 subse-
quent cases have adopted an intermediate test: "Classifications by 
188. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 63 (Haw. 1993) (quoting Loving, 388 U.S. at 3). 
189. Loving, 388 U.S. at 7-12. The state offered "no legitimate overriding purpose 
independent of invidious racial discrimination which justifies this classification." Id. at 
11. 
190. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 63. But see Dean v. District of Columbia, 18 Fam. L. Rep. 
(BNA) 1387 (D.C. Super. Ct. June 2, 1992), aff'd, No. 92-CV-737, 1995 WL 21117 
(D.C. Ct. App. Jan. 19, 1995) (trial judge quoting Biblical passages to sustain refusal of 
same-sex marriage). 
191. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). The majority opinion 
in Baehr relies upon this decision to apply strict scrutiny for sex based classifications. 
See Baehr, 852 P.2d at 66. 
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gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be 
substantially related to achievement of those objectives."192 Thus, the 
Hawaii Supreme Court had as possibilities the application of "some form 
of 'heightened' scrutiny, be it 'strict' or 'intermediate,' rather than mere 
'rational basis' analysis."193 The court adopted the former, the strictest 
test of judicial scrutiny. The reasoning of the court centered on the 
presence in the Hawaii Constitution of the Equal Rights Amend-
ment.194 This amendment raises the level of scrutiny to strict when 
examining sex-based classification under equal protection. 
It therefore follows, ... that [the statute upon which the plaintiffs base their 
claims] is presumed to be unconstitutional ... unless ... the State of Hawaii, 
can show that (a) the statute's sex-based classification is justified by compelling 
state interests and (b) the statute is narrowly drawn to avoid unnecessary 
abridgements of the applicant couples' constitutional rights.195 
The equal protection argument of Baehr also has due process 
implications. First, it suggests that "the due process right to marry [for 
gay and lesbian persons] continues to be an uphill battle."196 The 
justices deciding the case ignore the reality of plaintiff's homosexuality: 
"[I]t is immaterial whether the plaintiffs, or any of them, are homosexu-
als."197 They thus deny the inherent quality of personhood, the 
lifestyle-including conduct--of the gay or lesbian person. Furthermore, 
"[a]ll of the justices voting in Baehr rejected the plaintiffs' due process 
challenge, although four of the five ... were open to some kind of equal 
protection challenge."198 The Hawaii decision, therefore, even though 
it is significant for its rejection of the definitional obstacle to same-sex 
marriages, did not address the substantive due process rights of the 
litigants to marry because they were gay or lesbian. 
For purposes of gay and lesbian rights, a due process argument is 
preferable to equal protection .because it would signal the end of the 
192. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 64 (quoting Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976)). 
193. Id. at 65. 
194. Id. at 67. The court relied heavily on the concurring opinion of Justice Powell, 
joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Blackmun, in Frontiero. They provided 
substance to the theory that: "[H]ad the Equal Rights Amendment been incorporated 
into the United States Constitution, at least seven members (and probably eight) of the 
Frontiero Court would have subjected statutory sex-based classifications to 'strict' 
judicial scrutiny." Id. 
195. Id. It would be logical to think that the compelling state interest would result 
from the significant public anger over the court's allowance of a consideration of 
inclusion of same-sex partners within the definition of marriage. 
196. Eskridge, Jr., supra note 28, at 1509. 
197. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 58 n.17. Or, "[p]arties to a same-sex marriage could 
theoretically be either homosexuals or heterosexuals." Id. at 51 n.11. 
198. Eskridge, Jr., supra note 28, at 1509. 
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Bowers v. Hardwick era where conduct is equated with criminality and 
immorality. Due process recognition would ratify personhood;199 it· 
would recognize "the fundamental importance of lesbian and gay 
conduct."200 But none of this is present in Baehr.201 In that Baehr 
ignores the actuality of gay and lesbian conduct, it allows for Bowers v. 
Hardwick, perpetuates the status/conduct distinction, and worst of all, 
implies that two same-sex persons would seek to marry one another 
because one or both were· heterosexual-without any reference at all to 
the possibility that both may be responsible homosexuals 
The subtle and pervasive attitude of Bowers v. Hardwick is the central 
issue within the need for substantive due process attention. One 
commentator explains: "The phobic figural representations by which the 
Supreme Court produces a hierarchical differentiation or 'scaling' of 
homosexual and heterosexual acts and agency in the Hardwick decision 
provide an indispensable map of the ideological situation with which 
contemporary gay and lesbian politics must now contend."202 Oddly 
enough, it is like the scorn of the "apolitical, economically privileged 
students toward members of religions identified as 'hicky. "'203 Both 
groups, gay and lesbian persons and religious fundamentalists, share the 
distinction of being minority and different. Even though there is mutual 
distrust and even abhorrence, the two groups are quite similarly situated. 
Each suffers because the conduct of either is considered abnormal by the 
majority. Each suffers because each is the victim of "respectable 
199. See generally Rubenfeld, supra note 11; FRANK BROWNING, THE CULTURE 
OF DESIRE: PARADOX AND PERVERSITY IN GAY LIVES TODAY (1993); Raymond C. 
O'Brien, The Culture of Desire by Frank Browning, 9 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 
605 (1993) (book review). 
200. Cain, supra note 55, at 1633. 
201. An example of the type of substantive due process recognition which would 
have been advantageous in Baehr would be that found in High Tech Gays v. Defense 
Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 668 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1987), rev'd, 895 F.2d 563 
(9th Cir. 1990), where District Judge Thelton Henderson wrote: "The Supreme Court 
in Hardwick simply did not address the issue of all homosexual activity ... that two gay 
people have no right to touch each other in a way that expresses their affection and love 
for each other." Id. at 1370. 
202. Kendall Thomas, The Eclipse of Reason:· A Rhetorical Reading of Bowers v. 
Hardwick, 79 VA. L. REV. 1805, 1831 (1979). 
203. Lacey, supra note 32, at 16 (describing students in her classes at the University 
of Tulsa who directed scorn at the 10% of religious fundamentalists on the campus). 
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prejudice."204 Each ·group needs to address this prejudice if it is to 
have a voice in decisionmaking. This is at the heart of the due process 
struggle for gay and lesbian persons. 
Despite its limitations, Baehr and the judicial system of Hawaii have 
provided another step in the due process analysis directed towards gay 
and lesbian persons. By remanding the case with directions to define the 
compelling state interest for rejecting same-sex marriages, the Hawaiian 
courts have taken another step towards gay and lesbian identity.205 
Whether intentional or not, the debate regarding same-sex marriage will 
in fact focus on homosexuality even though this is not what the Hawaii 
Supreme Court acknowledged. This debate will discuss identity and 
differences, status and conduct, roles and realities. It will contribute to 
the structure of a substantive due process argument acknowledged by 
Justice Blackmun in his dissent to Bowers v. Hardwick. For him, the 
case did not involve homosexual sodomy, it involved "the fundamental 
interest all individuals have in controlling the nature of their intimate 
associations with others."206 Thus, Baehr is another step in describing 
the associations that lead to identity. 
So too, when the Hawaii Supreme Court analogizes the same-sex 
couple in Baehr to the black female and Caucasian male in Loving, it 
contributes to the substantive due process argument for gay and lesbian 
persons.207 The similarity provides the mechanism for accepting the 
fact that just as societal changes brought about the inclusion of 
interracial marriage within the definition of marriage, so too can societal 
change bring about the inclusion of gay and lesbian intimate associa-
tions, conduct, and status within the definition of marriage. The point 
of Baehr's reasoning is the premise of change; that amidst Stone-
r wall,208 Cammermeyer, Wasson, and Presidential support, there is an 
attitudinal change. The change js not without objection. The legislature 
204. Strongly held religious beliefs can often be victimized by prejudice that if 
directed towards women or persons of color would not be tolerated. So too, "Peter J. 
Gomes, an American Baptist minister and professor of Christian morals at Harvard 
University, has described homophobia as 'the last respectable prejudice of the century."' 
BRUCE BAWER, A PLACE AT THE TABLE: THE GAY INDIVIDUAL IN .AMERICAN SOCIETY 
81 (1993). 
205. See generally Ortiz, supra note 29. 
206. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 206 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
207. For an analysis of the unique relationship of homosexual and African 
Americans to the AIDS pandemic, see Raymond C. O'Brien, Discrimination: The 
Difference With AIDS, 6 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & PoL'Y 93 (1990). 
208. See MARTIN DUBERMAN, STONEWALL (1993) for a recounting of the Stonewall 
riots in 1969. See infra text accompanying note 213. 
202 
[VOL. 32: 163, 1995] Domestic Partnership 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
of Hawaii was quick to ban same-sex marriages.209 It is predictable 
that the citizens of Hawaii may initiate changes in their constitution to 
deflect the Baehr ruling, thereby forcing the issue upon federal courts 
not as willing to enter the domestic relations fray. 10 If the federal 
courts refuse to consider the question under an equal protection aegis, 
each state would adjudicate same-sex marriage individually, with 
recognition by other states based on public policy.211 The resulting 
debate will certainly affect the substantive rights of gay and lesbian 
persons. Such a debate will be essential, productive, and identifying. 
IV. THE GAY AND LESBIAN COMMUNITY 
When the Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund announced the 
decision in Baehr v. Lewin, it was described as "one of our movement's 
most significant legal victories to date."212 By the winter of 1994, 
Lambda had announced sixteen judicial, legislative, and political 
victories in four months.213 And 1994 was also the twenty-fifth 
anniversary of Stonewall, where: 
[a]t a little after one a.m. on the morning of June 28, 1969, the police carried 
out a routine raid on [a gay bar in New York's Greenwich Village]. But it 
turned out not to be routine at all. Instead of cowering-the usual reaction to 
a police raid-the patrons inside Stonewall and the crowd that gathered outside 
the bar fought back against the police. The five days of rioting that followed 
changed forever the face of lesbian and gay life. In the years since 1969, the 
209. See Hawaii Enacts Ban on Same-Sex Marriages, RECORD, June 24, 1994, at 
A38; Hawaii Law Bans Same-Sex "Marriage", WASH. TIMES, June 24, 1994, at A9; 
Susan Essoyan, Hawaii Tries to Take a Stand Against Same-Sex Marriages, L.A. TIMES, 
Apr. 26, 1994, at AS; Susan Yim, Hawaii Court Ruling Isn't End of Same-Sex Marriage 
Debate, DALLAS MORN. NEWS, Dec. 7, 1993, at A25. 
210. See generally CLARK, JR., supra note 13, § 12-2, at 414-20. 
211. The fact that one state might recognize same-sex marriages does not mean that 
another state would be forced to accept that recognition under Full Faith and Credit. 
Since recognition by one state would not constitute an adjudicated final judgment, the 
United States Constitution would not require recognition. Instead, public policy of other 
states would be the standard of recognition. See id. § 2.3, at 34-44. 
212. Evan Wolfson, Hawaii Supreme Court Paves Way for Same-Sex Marriage, 10 
LAMBDA UPDATE I (1993). 
213. See Beatrice Dohm, Victory!, 11 LAMBDA UPDATE 1 (1994) (victories included 
domestic partnership coverage in New York City, an anti-gay initiative blocked in 
Cincinnati, adoption and custody cases, the American with Disabilities Act which 
prohibits AIDS insurance caps, and access to dental health care in New York City for 
HIV infected persons). 
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Stonewall riots have become the central symbolic event of the modem gay 
movement. 214 
The victories and celebration are reflected in the angry cry of a young 
man at the start of the gay rights movement: "We don't want acceptance, 
goddamn it! We want respect!"215 
Respect is at the center of the substantive due process arguments; the 
issues involve an end to the military ban on gays and lesbians, same-sex 
marriage, and domestic partnership, to name a few. The object of the 
respect is the recognition of a lifestyle that is just as quixotic and 
developing as that within the heterosexual community. It is important 
to note that domestic partnership is attractive to the heterosexual 
community; there is a mutuality between the two on this issue, 
something that must be regarded as one of the most significant changes · 
in America. Heterosexuals may well be shocked to experience this 
similarity. After all, homosexuals have always been acutely aware of 
heterosexuals, but the difference today is that heterosexuals are 
increasingly aware of homosexuals. Frank Browning captures this 
unique change in his book, The Culture of Desire: 
Rich, raucous, passionate, sometimes self-absorbed, often petulant, the builders 
of the new gay social terrain in this country have, at the very least, challenged 
the way Americans think about desire in ordinary life. From the deepest 
hollows of Appalachia to the flattest prairies of Nebraska, there is not a high 
school football captain or cheerleader alive who does not know that there are 
other human plots than the ones taught in Sunday school or sold on the 
paperback racks at Rexall. ... By and by, all of us,homo and hetero, male and 
female, queer and conventional, are brought along onto journeys of rage and 
irony and sadness and revelation that neither the queer insurgents nor their 
pinched and prudish antagonists could have foreseen even a few years ago.216 
But respect demands responsibility. Within the gay and lesbian 
culture there are many voices. ,Among them is that of Frank Browning, 
who, when speaking of the debate and the conflict within the lesbian and 
gay community acknowledges: "In the culture of desire, there are no safe 
spaces."217 There is also Bruce Bawer, who writes: "Homosexuality 
itself doesn't circumscribe, it contributes; it doesn't commit all gay 
individuals to a single path in life, it merely exerts an influence on the 
distinctive course traveled by each individual."218 Bawer criticizes a 
particular faction which he calls the gay subculture,219 because he 
214. DOBERMAN, supra note 207, at inside cover. 
215. Id. at 211. 
216. BROWNING, supra note 198, at 25; see O'Brien, supra note 198. 
217. Browning, supra note 198, at 229. 
218. BAWER, supra note 203, at 38. 
219. Id. at 153-223. 
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believes "[i]t disdains the notion of individual identity and takes a 
reductive, narrowly deterministic view of homosexuality."220 He 
argues instead, in a thought borrowed from Mary Renault's The 
Charioteer: "[D]on't use your homosexuality or their contempt for it as 
an excuse to lower your moral standards. The important thing is to 
behave in such a way as to keep your own respect and that of people 
whose respect means something."221 It seems this is part of his 
conclusion that homosexuality "is neither good .nor evil. It simply is. 
And it will not go away."222 He rejects the comment made by a 
former professor of his: "[I]t's OK to be gay so long as you're ashamed 
of it."223 
Bawer makes an intriguing point about why visibility of a gay and 
lesbian culture is valuable as a contribution to gay identity and the 
formation of a substantive due process argument. He suggests looking 
at a rerun of an old Andy Griffith show. "If you 're white, try to imagine 
what it's like being a black person watching the same show. Think of 
it: a North Carolina town with no blacks whatsoever. None. Where are 
they?_ ... Well, that's what it's like being a gay man and watching 
virtually every TV drama and comedy."224 As America comes to 
recognize-through television and film and music, mostly-the presence 
of a culture of gay and lesbian persons, it will not find that they are all 
the same. Darrell Yates Rist traveled across America looking for "the 
real gay America beyond the stereotypes of the popular media. "225 His 
conclusion is that: 
Most of the men I met held more in common with their neighbors than.with all 
the other homosexual men I had ever known. And although I found intimate 
communities of homosexual men throughout the West, whose shared lives made 
them brothers, I found no trait that surely united all homosexual men in a single 
gay community. 226 
220. Id. at 38. 
221. Id. at 201. 
222. Id. at 49. 
223. Id. at 115. 
224. Id. at 92. 
225. See DARRELL Y. RIST, HEARTLANDS: A GAY MAN'S ODYSSEY ACROSS 
AMERICA at inside cover (1992); see also ROBERT C. REINHART, A HISTORY OF 
SHADOWS (1986) (stories from gay men who lived during the Depression, the war years, 
and the fifties). 
226. RIST, supra note 224, at 225. 
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Amidst this diversity is the emergence of the need for an identity, 
something other than desire. 
One of the distinct deductions of The Culture of Desire is the absolute necessity 
of gay and lesbian persons to arrive at a fulcrum upon which they can balance 
their own perceived individual identity as persons imbued with distinctive 
sexual conduct that is viewed by the media, and often by themselves, as 
aberrant, and at the same time something that defines themselves as an 
orientation, a formative group, a culture, a family.227 
What can bring this about? What can contribute to the notion that gay 
and lesbian persons are family? Surely through the history and the 
litigation, the political agendas and the media inclusion of homosexual 
identity, and the acceptance and living of life, gays and lesbians are 
facilitating family: 
Having spent years standing on sidewalks in movie lines watching straight 
couples nuzzling and embracing, same-sex couples now refuse to deny 
themselves demonstrative intimacy. Bombarded with straight adolescent 
romance films in their own youth, they have begun to film their own romance 
stories. With breadth and irony, they are creating and communicating their own 
queer plots.228 
If this is so, what comes next? "If friendship is to generate the 
genuine power of family, what must it do?"229 The answer "will 
surely have to confront these abiding American problems of individual-
ism and commitment. Along the way, it will have to move the family 
of friends beyond a celebration of private happiness to an affirmation of 
civic participation."230 There is little doubt that this is done in both 
the homosexual and heterosexual community. The essential difference 
is that it is much more obvious now, particularly in perspective of the 
AIDS pandemic, within the gay and lesbian community. But there is 
another aspect of civic participation that would be an avenue to greater 
commitment, another ingredient in a definitional family. This is 
domestic partnership. 
The gay and lesbian community has in domestic partnership a unique 
vehicle for the formation of family, for civic participation, and for 
increased protection under substantive due process. The argument could 
be made that domestic partnership flows from the community commit-
227. O'Brien, supra note 198, at 618. 
228. BROWNING, supra note 198, at 19. 
229. Id. at 157. 
230. Id. at 159. For similar themes directed towards mainstream American culture, 
see, for example, R. M. DWORKIN, LIFE'S DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION, 
EUTHANASIA, AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM (1993); PAUL D. KNOTT, REMAKING AMERICA: 
THE VALUES REVOLUTION (1994); MICHAEL GURIAN, THE PRINCE AND THE KlNG 
(1992). 
206 
[VOL. 32: 163, 1995] Domestic Partnership 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
ment over AIDS; the commitment continues between two persons. 
Likewise, to date, the domestic partnership arrangements have centered 
on the availability of benefits. The next stage is to incorporate shared 
responsibilities in the manner of support and obligation. It would be to 
the advantage of the gay and lesbian community to bring this about. 
True, for many persons, this responsibility is implied; but responsibility 
should now become a material provision for entitlement to benefits. 
Responsibility, quite simply, is the next stage. 
V. THE NEXT STAGE: RESPONSIBILITY 
At present, domestic partnerships provide benefits to the partners 
under the political or business programs discussed earlier.231 These 
benefits can include (1) access to company events and facilities, (2) 
bereavement/sickness leave, (3) employee assistance program/counseling, 
(4) relocation assistance, (5) health coverage, and (6) dental plan.232 
But what would happen if one of the partners became ill; would the 
other have the responsibility for payment of medical expenses above 
those provided by the employer? Would there be a responsibility for 
legal assistance, for·food, for housing, for what has come to be known 
as necessities?233 Under the common law, one spouse was required to 
provide support suitable to the other's rank and station in life, or 
commensurate with their circumstances or standard of living.234 Does 
a domestic partner have this duty of support? 
The issue arose in Seattle, Washington with this inquiry: "The City 
Council that passed the [ domestic partnership ordinance] last September 
231. See supra text accompanying notes 8-10. 
232. MICKENS, supra note 62, at 187 (describing those benefits at Lotus Develop-
ment Corp.). 
233. Between a husband and wife there is a duty of support during marriage 
according to their respective means and ability to perform the duty. Many states have 
statutes making nonsupport between spouses a crime. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE 
§ 230.5 (1980) ("A person commits a misdemeanor if he persistently fails to provide 
support which he can provide and which he knows he is legally obliged to provide to 
a spouse, child or other dependent."). Civil contempt enforcement is available as well. 
See generally Sybil M. Jones, The Problem of Family Support: Criminal Sanctions for 
the Enforcement of Support, 38 N.C. L. REV. 1 (1959). · 
234. See CLARK, JR., supra note 13, § 6.1, at 252-58. 
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has not explained whether local merchants can now sue one domestic 
partner if the other [partner] omits to pay his bills. 235
The answer is somewhat vague. As was stated in Marvin v. 
Marvin, 236 a partnership can be the basis of a duty of support either 
expressly or by implication. Thus, a responsibility of support exists 
outside of marriage, based on a partnership theory, and it would seem 
that this should apply to a domestic partnership as well.237 The 
advances made in the theory of partnership between two adults as the 
vehicle of support during and after marriage, between prenuptial and 
postnuptial agreements, provides substance to a new understanding of 
support responsibility. But with this responsibility comes the necessity 
of providing the court with a basis for its order. Thus, there are two 
rationales upon which greater responsibility could be established between 
the two partners: implied partnership and express partnership. The 
former rests upon equity and the latter upon either an agreement between 
the two parties or the adoption of a statute applicable to domestic 
partnerships. Again, the point is to take domestic partnership from 
benefits to responsibility. 
A. Implied Theory of Responsibility 
The essential element in Marvin was that the contract between two 
adults, must be suppported "by some recognized underlying obligation in 
law or equity."23 Without this obligation, no benefits accrue.239 
Because responsibility through implication will come about on a case-by-
235. Daniel Seligman, Seeking Fame in Congress, Where Liberals Are Rich, 
Cohabiting For Fun and Profit, and Other Matters, FORTUNE, Dec. 4, 1989, at 188. 
236. 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976); see supra text 
accompanying notes 14-19 and 106. See generally JeffC. Marderosian, Comment, The 
Property Rights of Unmarried Cohabitants-A Proposal, 14 CAL. W. L. REV. 485 
(1979); Comment, Property Rights Upon Termination of Unmarried Cohabitation: 
Marvin v. Marvin, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1708 (1977); Christina M. Fernandez, Note, 
Beyond Marvin: A Proposal for Quasi-Spousal Support, 30 STAN. L. REV. 359 (1978); 
Linda R. Larson, Comment, Domestic Relations-- Disposition of Property Upon 
Termination of Nonmarital Cohabitation-Marvin v. Marvin, 53 WASH. L. REV. 145 
(1977); GRAHAM DoUTHWAITE, UNMARRIED COUPLES AND THE LAW (1979). 
237. But see Davis v. Misiano, 366 N.E.2d 752 (Mass. 1977) (refusing to provide 
for a duty of support between non-marital persons). 
238. Marvin v. Marvin, 122 Cal. App. 3d 871, 871, 176 Cal. Rptr. 555,556 (1981); 
see also In re Black, 160 Cal. App. 3d 582, 206 Cal. Rptr. 663 (1984) (claim by 
unmarried cohabitant to 50% of all property held by the decedent at the time of his 
death). 
239. See, e.g., Murphy v. Bowen, 756 S.W.2d 149 (Ky. Ct. App. 1988) (holding 
that even though both parties had lived together for 11 years without statutory or 
common law marriage, there was no evidence of either an express or implied agreement 
of joint venture or partnership, so no obligations of support arose). 
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case basis, will be less precise than express responsibility, and will vary 
among the different jurisdictions, the New Jersey approach offers insight. 
New Jersey has been a leader in imposing equitable obligations. For 
instance, in MHB v. HT.B.,240 the Supreme Court of New Jersey held 
that the doctrine of equitable estoppel was applicable to preclude a 
former husband, Henry, from denying a duty to provide child support on 
behalf of a child fathered by another, not himself.241 The facts are 
very important. A man and a woman were validly married and during 
the first five years of their marriage they conceived two children. 
Shortly after the five years the wife had a brief extra-marital affair and, 
while still married to her husband, gave birth to a daughter which the 
husband learned was not his own. With this knowledge, the husband 
moved out of the house, but for the next three years did not divorce his 
wife and did in fact support all three children with money, phone calls, 
letters, gifts, and visits.242 There followed a six-month period of 
reconciliation during which time the couple lived together with the 
children, but the reconciliation failed and the mother was awarded 
custody while the father agreed to pay family support. 
When a final decree of divorce was obtained, both parties "stipulated 
that all three children were born of the marriage."243 No alimony was 
awarded, but the husband continued to pay child support, and "[a]ll three 
minor children remained objects of Henry's affection, attention, and 
solicitude throughout the post-divorce period. In particular, Henry 
expressed interest in and concern for [his putative daughter]. ... [She] 
knows no other father, [ even though her natural father lives nearby,] and 
is ignorant of the facts surrounding her paternity."244 Based on all of 
the evidence, the trial judge concluded that Henry had become the 
child's "psychological, if not biological parent."245 
240. 498 A.2d 775 (N.J. 1985); see also J.W.P. v. W.W. & J.H.P., 604 A.2d 695 
(N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1990) (sustaining equitable estoppel, but refusing to use 
doctrine to release natural father from obligation of support). 
241. MH.B., 498 A.2d at 781. Note that this case is not about the statutory duty 
of a stepparent for the support of a stepchild while the stepparent is married to the 
natural parent. For this, see Washington Statewide Org. of Stepparents v. Smith, 536 
P.2d 1202 (Wash. 1975). 
242. M.H.B., 498 A.2d at 776. 
243. Id. 
244. Id. 
245. Id. at 777. 
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Shortly thereafter, Henry remarried and then began to withhold support 
payments. Specifically, by a pre-trial motion, Henry claimed that he 
should be under no duty to support his putative daughter, as a blood test 
confirmed that he was not the father of the child.246 The trial judge 
concluded that the doctrine of equitable estoppel was applicable to 
preclude Henry from denying the duty to provide child support. 247 
The framework for the analysis was provided by a previous New Jersey 
decision, Miller v. Miller.248 The MH.B. court acknowledged the 
Miller court's rationale that, "[b]ecause we were dealing with respon-
sibilities that may flow from familial relationships that are inherently 
complicated and subtle, we acknowledged that the application of 
equitable principles called for great sensitivity, caution, and flexibili-
ty."249 
One of the elements of equitable estoppel applied by the New Jersey 
court was "irreparable harm."250 Again, quoting Miller, the court 
found that "there is an innate immorality in the conduct of an adult who 
for over a decade accepts and proclaims a child as his own, but then, in 
order to be relieved of the child's support, announces, and relies upon 
his bastardy."251 Such could be said of the domestic partnership 
between two adults, with or without political registration, where one 
provides financial support and then leaves, or refuses to pay for at least 
the necessities of life. Thus, in the case of Braschi v. Stahl Assocs., 
Co.,252 where the two men had been together and shared significant 
incidents of life for over _ten years before one of them died, would there 
be irreparable harm to deny support to one upon which he relied, and the 
other freely gave for so long a period of time? And if Sharon 
Kowalski's parents had sued the now comatose daughter's life partner 
246. Id. 
247. Id. 
248. 478 A.2d 351 (N.J. 1984). This case involved two girls whose mother 
remarried after divorcing their father. During the mother's second marriage, the 
defendant, her second husband, assumed sole responsibility for the girl's financial 
support. as well as other parental privileges and obligations. He discouraged his wife 
and stepchildren from having contact with the former husband and natural father, but 
nonetheless, after the divorce that ended seven years of marriage he refused to continue 
child support for the stepchildren. The court held that he was equitably estopped to deny 
his duty to continue to support the stepchildren. Id. at 353. 
249. MH.B., 498 A.2d at 777 (paraphrasing from Miller). For an example of a 
court stating that it needed a sufficiently definite and predictable test to allow for 
consistent application from case to case, see Elden v. Sheldon, 46 Cal. 3d 267, 758 P.2d 
582, 250 Cal. Rptr. 254 (1988). 
250. MH.B., 498 A.2d at 779. 
251. Id. at 780. 
252. 543 N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1989) (allowing non-marital partners to become 
family for purposes of rent control law in New York City). 
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for four years, seeking to obtain support for long-term care for their 
daughter from the person who had shared significant incidents of 
life-court referred to them as a family of affinity-would there have 
been irreparable harm to deny them relief?253 These are cases in which 
the partners have not signed an agreement, nor registered with a business 
or city. 
Establishing an implied theory of responsibility between a parent and 
a putative child may seem justified from the perspective of the 
vulnerability of the child; the irreparable harm to the child and the 
concomitant inability of the child to foresee the harm, justify a remedy. 
But the New Jersey Supreme Court is content to address both the adult's 
and the minor's expectations because of the establishment of an 
"intimate familial relationship."254 Increasingly, the court is drawn to 
the fact that when a bond is established in which expectations are 
raise - such as in most domestic partnerships - an implied theory of 
responsibility attaches. Specific cases are likely to follow. 
In June, 1994, the New Jersey Supreme Court, in Dunphy v. Gregor, 
issued an opinion which further erodes the distinction between married 
and unmarried cohabitants, and adopted instead, a standard based on the 
significance and stability of the plaintiff's relationship.255 Dunphy was 
engaged to marry Burwell and had been living with him for two years 
when she witnessed him being struck by a car while changing a flat tire. 
Burwell's body was tossed or dragged 240 feet as a result of the 
collision and all Dunphy could do when she reached him was to clear 
pebbles and blood from his mouth, attempt to subdue his hands and feet 
as he thrashed about, and comfort him. Burwell died some hours later 
in the hospital. As a result of her experience, Dunphy was undergoing 
psychiatric treatment. She sought to recover from the driver of the car 
damages for the "mental anguish, pain and suffering" experienced as a 
result of witnessing the events that led to the death of her fiance.256 
New Jersey had heretofore applied the test adopted in Califomia257 
253. See In re Guardianship of Kowalski, 478 N.W.2d 790 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) 
(awarding guardianship over disabled partner to her life partner of four years). 
254. Dunphy v. Gregor, 642 A.2d 372, 375 (N.J. 1994). 
255. Id. at 374. 
256. Id. at 373. 
257. Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968). But 
see Elden v. Sheldon, 46 Cal. 3d 267, 758 P.2d 582,250 Cal. Rptr. 254 (1988) (refusing 
to extend recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress to nonmarital 
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requiring a marital or intimate, familial relationship between plaintiff and 
the injured person before recovery could be had for negligent infliction 
of emotional distress, but was divided as to whether marriage was a 
condition of recovery. In a departure from other states, the New Jersey 
Supreme Court found marriage was not a prerequisite. Instead, the court 
allowed recovery based on the significance and stability of the plaintiff's 
relationship with the injured party. The jury may determine the 
significance and stability based on: 
the duration of the relationship, the degree of mutual dependence, the extent of 
common contributions to a life together, the extent and quality of shared 
experience, ... ''whether the plaintiff and the injured person were members of 
the same household, their emotional _reliance on each other, the particulars of 
their day to day relationship, and the manner in which they related to each other 
in attending to life's mundane requirements."258 
The significance of this decision is that it allows for recovery outside 
of the status of marriage based on an implied theory of responsibility. 
While recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress is a benefit 
to the plaintiff, such a theory has equal applicability of responsibility to 
the plaintiff. It is logical to suggest that a relationship that is significant 
and stable may imply not only benefits, but also responsibilities. 
B. Express Theory of Responsibility 
Express responsibility could take the form of an agreement between 
the two parties, a statute mandating responsibility or characterizing the 
status of the relationship, or a combination of the two. Based on the 
ascendancy of the partnership approach to marriage and the inherent 
nature of domestic partnership itself, it would seem that agreements 
between two adult contracting' parties will be the likely source of 
litigation in the future. What did the parties contract? The agreement 
should therefore be the subject of increased scrutiny by both heterosexu-
al and homosexual communities. Later, as domestic partnerships achieve 
greater use and are accorded greater status, statutory efforts may follow 
as a means by which uniformity and fairness can be achieved. 
1. Private Agreements 
As with prenuptial agreements and non-marital contracts, the 
disclosure, equity, and capacity of the two parties to an express 
cohabitants). 
258. Dunphy, 642 A.2d at 375 (quoting Dunphy v. Gregor, 617 A.2d 1248, 1255 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992)). 
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agreement would be essential. The two parties, regardless of sexual 
orientation, would have the ability, under a theory of partnership, to 
establish the terms of their arrangement in the same manner as parties 
to any other non-marital contract. Nonetheless, because of the presence 
of domestic partnership, either business or government benefits would 
be included. Excluded would be exclusive control over children or 
public policy restraints that do not suffer because of privacy, equal 
protection, or due process arguments. The parties can benefit from the 
forms, literature, and comments made about non-marital contracts to 
date.259 In some instances, the non-marital couple, even though 
seeking a domestic partnership, may wish to limit the benefits and 
obligations of the relationship. In such instances, forms such as an anti-
palimony agreement could be utilized to eliminate implied obliga-
tions.260 
An anti-palimony agreement, executed between two cohabiting non-
marital partners, requires full disclosure and a writing. Its purpose is to: 
define the financial arrangements, rights, and responsibilities between the parties 
while they are living together unmarried and at such time as they may cease to 
live together, and to provide that their living together unmarried will not create 
any financial rights in either party against the income or the property of the 
other party.261 
The elements of the agreement include the following: 
(1) Advice of Counsel: It is necessary to have independent counsel 
who consults with each party and who assists with full disclosure, 
fairness, and full and mature consideration. 
(2) No Common Law Marriage: The intention not to enter into any 
form of marriage is made clear. 
259. See, e.g., Martha L. Fineman, Law and Changing Patterns of Behavior: 
Sanctions on Non-marital Cohabitation, 1981 WIS. L. REV. 275; Herma H. Kay & Carol 
Amyx, Marvin v. Marvin: Preserving the Options, 65 CAL. L. REV. 937 (1977); William 
A. Reppy, Jr., Property and Support Rights of Unmarried Cohabitants: A Proposal for 
Creating a New Legal Status, 44 LA. L. REV. 1677 (1984); Judith T. Younger, Marital 
Regimes: A Story of Compromise and Demoralization, Together With Criticism and 
Suggestions for Reform, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 45 (1981); Joel E. Smith, Annotation, 
Property Rights Arising from Relationship of Couple Cohabiting Without Marriage, 3 
A.LR.4th 13 (1981). 
260. See, e.g., DAVID WESTFALL, DOCUMENTS AND STATUTES IN FAMILY LAW 156 
(2d ed. 1994). 
261. Id. 
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(3) Complete Waiver of Financial Rights: "This waiver and release 
shall apply while the parties live together, after they cease to live 
together for any reason (if such event ever occurs) while both are living, 
and after the death of either or both parties."262 
(4) Limitations of Waiver Rights: The agreement is void if the parties 
marry in a statutory manner, and if, ''while both parties are living, they 
cease to live together, the net fair market value of any joint property 
shall be divided equally between them."263 
(5) Household and Other Expenses: There exists a mutuality of 
support, but "no legally enforceable obligation to support the other party 
shall have been created. "264 
(6) Voluntary Transfers: Inter vivas and testamentary transfers will 
not be affected by the agreement, each party retaining the right to 
transfer or receive transfers from others. 
(7) Debts: "[E]ach party shall be responsible for his or her own debts 
incurred before and after the date of this Agreement, and each party 
specifically agrees to indemnify and to hold the other party harmless 
from any liability, loss, damage, or expense arising therefrom."265 
(8) Separate Property: This section characterizes property of each 
party. 
(9) Disclaimer: Each of the parties desires and intends that this 
Agreement supersede any statutory or other legal or equitable rights he 
or she might have or otherwise acquire in the other's property or to 
obtain support or maintenance from the other as a result of their living 
together unmarried or in a common-law marriage.266 
(10) Effect of Nondisclosure: Property discovered after this agreement 
belonging to the other party does not waive the agreement. 
(11) Governing Law: Parties may choose the applicable law. 
(12) Modification of the Agreement: "This Agreement may be modified, 
altered, or revoked only by a writing executed by the parties with the 
same formality as this Agreement."267 
(13) Arbitration: "Any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to 
this Agreement or the termination or breach thereof shall be resolved by 
arbitration. A board of three arbitrators shall be used, each party 
choosing one arbitrator and the two arbitrators choosing a third. The 
262. Id. at 158. 
263. Id. 
264. Id. at 159. 
265. Id. 
266. Id. at 160. 
267. Id. at 161. 
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decision of the majority of the board shall be controlling. A majority of 
the board may specify the arbitration procedures. "268 
(14) Miscellaneous: This section provides for expenses of litigation, 
partial invalidity or revocation, and states that the Agreement contains 
the entire understanding of the parties. 
There is similarity between this anti-palimony agreement and the 
Uniform Premarital Agreement Act.269 The differences being in the 
popular acceptance of premarital agreements and the fact that they 
become effective upon marriage, whereas anti-palimony agreements are 
not popular and cease to be effective upon marriage. They both 
emphasize the ability of the couple to enter into a private binding 
contractual partnership. The implications of this should not be omitted 
in developing greater responsibility within domestic partnerships. 
2. Statutory Agreements 
Of this we can be certain, as domestic partnerships become more 
prevalent among American couples, cities, states, and the federal 
government will seek greater involvement.270 Litigation will incite 
some legislation. Further legislation will come about through develop-
ment of the issue and through the lobbying efforts of groups· with 
cohabiting partners, both heterosexual and homosexual. It is likely that 
statutory efforts would include some of the following: 
Mutual obligations. States may wish to exceed the implied limits of 
responsibility enumerated in cases described earlier, 271 and require as 
268. Id. 
269. Id. at 164-72. 
270. For instance, Internal Revenue Code provisions affecting alimony and separate 
maintenance, transfers of property between spouses or incident to divorce, and certain 
property settlements, could be equally applicable to domestic partnership status 
established by the states. See I.R.C. §§ 71, 1041, 2516 (1992). Likewise, surviving 
spouse designations for joint and survivor annuity pre-retirement survivor annuities 
could be amended to include domestic partners. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1055, 1056(d) (1988). 
271. See supra notes 237-38. For a statutory example of support in reference to 
marital couples, see CAL. FAM. CODE§ 4320 (West 1994). 
In ordering . . . support . . . the court shall consider all of the following 
circumstances: 
(a) The extent to which the earning capacity of each party is sufficient to 
maintain the standard of living established during the [partnership], taking into 
account all of the following: 
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a matter of public policy that partners be "subject to the general rules 
governing fiduciary relationships which control the actions of persons 
occupying confidential relations with each other."272 General rules for 
liability would protect the rights of creditors of domestic partner-
ships.273 Of course, since partnership agreements between adults 
cannot deprive the state of its role in the protection of minors, any 
children born to cohabiting non-marital couples would be protected 
under existing statutory provisions. 
In one area of the law, estates and trusts, the reality of domestic 
partnerships and the changes in American society it represents, has 
become a factor in recent statutory changes. In adopting the 1990 
Uniform Probate Code, the Joint Editorial Board of the Uniform Probate 
Code adopted an approach which accepted the decline of formalism in 
the American definition of family, and this recognition affects the 
transfer of property at death. 274 The issue is whether states, the 
Id. 
(1) The marketable skills of the supported party; the job market for those 
skills; the time and expenses required for the supported party to acquire the 
appropriate education or training to develop those skills; and the possible 
need for retraining or education to acquire other, more marketable skills or 
employment. 
(2) The extent to which the supported party's present or future earning 
capacity is impaired by periods of unemployment that were incurred during the 
[partnership] to permit the supported party to devote time to domestic duties. 
(b) The extent to which the supported party contributed to the attainment of 
an education, training, a career position, or a license by the supporting party. 
( c) The ability to pay of the supporting party, taking into account the 
supporting party's earning capacity, earned and unearned income, assets, and 
standard of living. · 
(d) The needs of each party based on the standard of living established during 
the [partnership]. 
(e) The obligations and assets, including the separate property, of each party. 
(f) The duration of the {partnership]. 
(g) The ability of the supported party to engage in gainful employment without 
unduly interfering with the interests of dependent children in the custody of the 
party. 
(h) The age and health of the parties. 
(i) The immediate and specific tax consequences to each party. 
(j) Any other factors the court determines are just and equitable. 
272. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 72l(b) (West 1994). 
273. See, e.g., id. § 910 (referring to liability for debts in the marital context); see 
.also id. §§ 2620-28. 
274. See U.P.C., art. 2, Prefatory Note (1990); see also James Lindgren, The Fall 
of Formalism, 55 ALB. L. REV. 1009 (1992); Margaret V. Turano, UPC Section 2-201: 
Equal Treatment of Spouses?, 55 ALB. L. REV. 983 (1992); Gregory S. Alexander, 
Ademption and the Domain of Formality in Wills Law, 55 ALB. L. REV. 1067 (1992); 
Mary P. Treuthart, Adopting a More Realistic Definition of "Family", 26 GoNZ. L. 
REV. 91 (1991); Lawrence W. Waggoner, The Multiple-Marriage Society and Spousal 
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traditional purveyor of wealth at death through statutes guarantying 
intestate275 or testate distribution, will make the connection between 
the joint efforts of married couples and the joint efforts of non-marital 
cohabitants.276 If the essential ingredient is the partnership between the 
two, and because of that partnership economic benefits were acquired, 
the status of marriage should not be the deciding factor in the distribu-
tion of that wealth upon the death of either party. 
The Uniform Probate Code, because of its purpose "to make uniform 
the law among the various jurisdictions,"27 is a good vehicle from 
which to discuss provisions in the law of intestate and testate succession 
that could change in providing for domestic partners. The Uniform 
Probate Code was certainly not intended as a source for the possible 
inclusion of domestic partners, but one should consider the following: 
Share of the Spouse. The most recent revision of tlie Code increased 
the share of the surviving spouse, thus recognizing a trend evidenced in 
empirical studies.278 The availability of domestic partnerships could 
support the inclusion of the partner as an intestate heir with the same 
portion as that which would have gone to the spouse. Particular 
remedies to restrict inequities, such as elective share, 279 augmented 
estate,280 entitlement under a premarital will,281 homestead allow-
ance,282 exempt property,283 and family allowance,284 may all in-
Rights Under the Revised Uniform Probate Code, 76 IOWA L. REV. 223 (1991); Jane 
Drummey, Note, Family Ties: A Comparison of the Changing Legal Definition of Family 
in Succession Rights to Rent-Regulated Housing in the United States and Great Britain, 
17 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 123 (1991); Sol Lovas, When Is a Family Not a Family? 
Inheritance and the Taxation of Inheritance Within the Non-Traditional Family, 24 
IDAHO L. REV. 353 (1988). 
275. The intestate estate is defined as "[a]ny part of a decedent's estate not 
effectively disposed of by will." U.P.C. § 2-lOl(a) (1990). 
276. Other state statutes and uniform acts would be subject to the same inquiry. 
See, e.g., JOHN H. LANGBEIN & LAWRENCE w. WAGGONER, SELECTED STATUTES ON 
TRUSTS AND ESTATES 585, 652 (1994) (relating to the Revised Uniform Principal and 
Income Act and Uniform Marital Property Act). 
277. U.P.C. § 1-102(b)(5) (1990). 
278. Id. § 2-102, cmt. 
279. Id. §§ 2-201, 2-203, 2-207. 
280. Id. § 2-202. 
281. Id. § 2-301. 
282. Id. § 2-402. 
283. Id. § 2-403. 
284. Id. § 2-404. 
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elude domestic partners in addition to marital spouses. And again, some 
would apply to both intestate and testate distribution. 
Additional inclusion could be made as to the effect of divorce, 
annulment or separation,285 the meaning of relative,286 the priorities 
of who may be a guardian287 or a conservator,288 or any other special 
status enjoyed by a spouse. It is not that marriage is unimportant, it is 
simply that, since domestic partnership presumes the absence of a spouse 
but nonetheless the presence of wealth that accumulates in a partnership 
fashion, the person who contributed to that function should participate 
in the economic distribution without contest from a formal family. 
These statutory changes are not likely to come about in the near 
future. Private agreements between domestic partners will need to 
develop and bring about a change in attitude, acceptance, and reliance 
before legislative recognition will follow. Nonetheless, the debate has 
started and since the change in marriage from status to partnership has 
begun already, it is likely that, with the implementation of more 
domestic partnerships, statutory rights to the transfer of wealth at death 
will occur. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court of Hawaii recognized--and caused great public 
scrutiny of---a significant change in the way family is defined when it 
held, in Baehr v. Lewin, that it was now necessary for the state to 
provide compelling reasons to deny persons of the same-sex the right to 
marry. Changes had been taking place as a result of Griswold's privacy, 
Eisenstadt's individuality, Marvin's non-marital contracts, and the host 
of other judicial, social, and moral changes in America. The Hawaiian 
decision, no matter what the outcome, has had far less impact than the 
changes brought about through judicial and legislative recognition of 
partnership as the functional basis of adult relationships. Because 
partnership has demanded expressional forms in addition to marriage, 
non-marital contracts and domestic partnerships developed. While 
neither of these approaches the history, significance, or status of 
marriage, each is unique and now firmly established as a business 
incentive and a political boon. Like them or not, domestic partnerships 
285. Id. §§ 2-802, 2-804. 
286. See id. § 2-603. 
287. See id. § 5-305(c)(l) ("[T]he spouse of the incapacitated person or a person 
nominated by will of a deceased spouse or by other writing signed by the spouse and 
attested by at least 2 witnesses [is entitled to consideration for appointment]."). 
288. See id. § 5-409(a)(3) ("[T]he spouse of the protected person [is entitled to 
consideration for appointment]."). 
218 
[VOL. 32: 163, 1995] Domestic Partnership 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
offer an alternative to marriage for both the heterosexual and homosexu-
al couple seeking a bit more permanence, and perhaps a bit more benefit. 
For the gay or lesbian person, domestic partnership is an opportunity 
for public recognition. This implies the struggle of equal protection and 
the years since Stonewall in 1969, the lifting of the military ban and the 
abolition of sodomy statutes in southern courts, plus the recognition that 
two men could share all the necessities of life in a rent-controlled 
apartment in New York City and be more than strangers. It implies that 
a lower court in Hawaii must now provide compelling reasons why two 
adults who are of the same sexual orientation should be prevented from 
marrying in a state sanctioned ceremony. 
Most of all, domestic partnership implies for the gay and lesbian 
community an argument for due process of law. This is the theory that 
homosexuality is not a choice, it is an orientation and entitled to the 
same life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness as those persons within a 
heterosexual orientation. It is an element of personhood to want and 
achieve partnership; it is a recognition of family. 
To date, domestic partnership has provided benefits. The benefits are 
increasing at both the business and political levels. Nonetheless, the 
next stage for domestic partners must be the inclusion of responsibility. 
For gay and lesbian persons responsibility would assist in bringing about 
the substantive due process arguments so sought by litigators. That is, 
by accepting the obligations of life, the status of family and commitment 
and production would lend credence to sexual orientation claims of both 
equality and substance. 
The detractors------and they would include persons who rationally believe 
that the traditional family is the family of form-need to be brought into 
dialogue and made aware of the advantages of domestic partnership. 
America is a nation based on a Judeo-Christian sense of morality, and 
this religious· heritage is not something to be abandoned by domestic 
partners, nor by those who see in domestic partnership another step in 
an expanding agenda of social change. Instead, the heirs of this 
religious heritage must confront the issue of immutability of sexual 
orientation. Also to be confronted is the fact that domestic partnership, 
benefits and responsibilities, does not have as its primary object sexual 
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activity. To dwell upon this fallacy is to fall victim to the heritage of 
Bowers v. Hardwick, rather than the "great mystery" of family.289 
The advantage to society from the incorporation of domestic 
partnership is far more evident if responsibility results. But nonetheless, 
the issue that all must confront is whether the state can recognize a 
different form of family already in existence. Can the state-without 
tradition and without the religious underpinnings that form that 
tradition-establish a new objective standard of what constitutes family? 
The answer to this will appear in the way in which we utilize judicial 
decisions recognizing implied responsibility towards children and 
between persons not married but sufficiently considered to be family to 
allow recovery under traditional tort theories. Children make a 
difference, too, and domestic partnership must account for them as well. 
Finally, the future of domestic partnership will develop through private 
consensual agreements. The future alone can determine what will 
happen with legislative enactments. Nonetheless, both heterosexual and 
-homosexual persons and groups should analyze the possibilities of 
statutory inclusion of domestic partnerships. These must particularly 
include changes in the tax code to allow greater equality between marital 
partners and domestic partners. But changes are warranted in the 
manners in which we transfer wealth upon death. If marriage is 
increasingly a partnership in scope, it is not only equitable but predict-
able that the domestic partner should be provided with the same testate 
and intestate benefits as the marital partner. But when all is said and 
-done, no matter what society implies or exacts, domestic partnership is 
still-simply-an index of belonging. 
289. Ephesians 5:32 (New American Bible). 
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